




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**CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE**

BOOKS BY  
G. ZAY WOOD

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1. China, the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
2. The Chino-Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915.
3. The Twenty-one Demands.
4. China, Japan and the Shantung Question.

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# China, the United States AND THE Anglo-Japanese Alliance

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
TO

HIS EXCELLENCY SAO-KE ALFRED SZE

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the  
Republic of China to the United States of  
America,

This Book is respectfully  
Dedicated





## FOREWORD

**I**N view of the great interest which has been aroused by the conference on limitation of armaments and on the questions relating to the Pacific and to the Far East, no apology is needed for the appearance of this book on The Anglo-Japanese alliance, which is admittedly one of the most important questions yet to be solved. The alliance has, because of its very nature, an intimate bearing upon the question of limitation of armaments, and a still closer connection with the problems affecting the Pacific and the Far East. It is almost axiomatic to say that no agreement can be reached upon limitation of armaments without settling first the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and that no settlement can be arrived at in regard to these problems, unless the Anglo-Japanese alliance is definitely disposed of. The continuance or discontinuance of the alliance will, therefore, contribute in no small degree to the success or failure of the armament conference at Washington.

The design of this treatise, as its name implies, is to give a short account of the history of the alliance, and to show the reasons, from the Chinese and American points of view, why it should not be

renewed. No attempt is made to be exhaustive in treatment.

The author begs to acknowledge his indebtedness to his friends who have lent him assistance in the gathering of the material, and to the Editor of *China Review* for permission to reproduce here part of an article which has previously appeared in its columns.

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# CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

## I

### INTRODUCTION

THERE is nothing in the sphere of international politics at present that merits more attention or deserves more careful study than the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance—a subject upon which the Imperial Conference of the Premiers of the British Dominions has dwelt during its sessions in London, but about which no decision has since been reached, not only because of the serious difference of views held by the statesmen from the Dominions, but also because of the vigorous opposition coming from China and the United States.

First concluded in 1902, revised and renewed in 1905, and again in 1911, the alliance has now reached its stipulated term of ten years. In virtue of the self-extending clause found in the treaty, the alliance will, however, remain binding until one year after it is denounced by either of the high

contracting parties. In July, 1920, Japan and Great Britain, when considering the future of the alliance, sent a joint communication to the Secretary of the League of Nations, in which the hope was expressed that, if the alliance were to continue, it would be so revised and modified as not to be in conflict with the spirit of the Covenant of the League.

Whether this communication was due to the desire of the contracting Powers to comply with the letter as well as the spirit of the Covenant of the League, or it was merely an attempt on their part to dodge the issue which they should have then faced with courage and decision, it is useless to inquire. Great Britain has since made it known that the renewal or non-renewal of the alliance depends largely, if not entirely, upon the pleasure of her Dominions. Japan, on the other hand, anxious as she has been for the continuance of the alliance in one form or another, has resorted to all legitimate means of diplomacy to realise her ambition. She sent her Crown Prince to England on a state visit at an estimated cost of \$2,000,000, and whatever ostensible reasons may have been given, the real purpose of the visit was to stimulate whatever little enthusiasm there was in England for the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to pave the way for its renewal. It has been said, of course, that the visit was a friendly one, and that it was designed to improve and to strengthen Anglo-

Japanese friendship. But it is unnecessary to add that, to the Japanese people and Government alike, "friendship" with Great Britain is almost synonymous with the continuance of the alliance, for in their eyes nothing could be more unfriendly on the part of Great Britain than to dissolve the partnership that has lasted nearly twenty years.

The Imperial Conference of the Premiers of the British Dominions met in London, June 20, and lasted to August 5, 1921. Among the subjects discussed at the Conference was the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which, in view of its vital bearing upon the problem of Imperial defence, upon the Anglo-American relationship, and upon the British policy in the Far East, outstripped in importance all the other questions on the Conference agenda. Unfortunately, the statesmen upon whom the British Government has depended for a decision as to the future of the alliance, have held different views on the subject, and consequently failed to reach a definite conclusion. Mr. Arthur Meighen, the Prime Minister of Canada, strongly opposed the renewal of the alliance on the ground that it has served its purpose, that it is no longer in harmony with the new international spirit, and that its continuance is harmful to the cordial relations between Canada and the United States. This view was ably supported by General Smuts from South Africa who insisted that the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance must be

subordinated to the consideration of the absolute necessity, as an essential and cardinal principle of British foreign policy, of maintaining a cordial understanding and co-operation between the British Empire and the United States. Even India objected to the renewal of the alliance, as His Highness the Maharajah of Kutch, the representative of the Indian princes at the Imperial Conference, resented the idea that it would ever be found necessary to call on Japanese troops to defend India against outside attack. On the other hand, Premier Hughes of Australia, who was supported in his contentions by Premier Massey of New Zealand, urged the renewal of the alliance which, he declared, was the best and cheapest means of protecting Australia as it provided a strong check upon Japan.

This divergence of views is largely responsible for the failure of the Imperial Conference to reach a definite decision as to the continuance or discontinuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The British Government, while disposed to drop the combination altogether in deference to the wishes of Canada, South Africa and India, was, however, unwilling to take any step that would have the appearance of throwing over an ally of some twenty years. To temporise once again, Japan and Great Britain sent another joint communication to the Secretary of the League of Nations, in which they agreed that, while the alliance remains in force, the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the

League shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the alliance, in case where the one is inconsistent with the other. This communication is dated July 7, 1921, and no action has been taken since. As it stands now, the Anglo-Japanese alliance remains in force until one full year after it is denounced by either of the high contracting parties.

What is to be done with the alliance? Will it be revised and renewed? Should it be renewed at all? These questions are easy to ask, but difficult to answer. It requires sufficient knowledge of the history of the alliance and a close acquaintance with the public sentiments in Japan, Great Britain, China and the United States to answer them correctly. Students of international politics frequently find it unwise, if not unsafe, to anticipate events before they occur. It is not the object of this book to predict what will or will not happen to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the future. Its purpose is to show, with facts widely known and with arguments generally recognised,<sup>5</sup> why the alliance should not be renewed at all, in any form and under any circumstances.'

As has been pointed out at the beginning, there is nothing in the field of international politics at present that deserves more attention than the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Aside from the contracting Powers themselves who are naturally most concerned with the renewal or non-renewal



of the alliance, there are two other Powers whose interest in the matter is second only to that of Japan and Great Britain, and whose views ought to be taken into careful consideration in deciding the future of the alliance. These two Powers are China and the United States, who are greatly interested in the subject, each for her own reasons.

About the attitude of the United States towards the renewal of the alliance, enough has been said and written. It has been generally, but correctly, assumed that the sentiment in this country is entirely against its renewal for the simple reason that, in the absence of a plain provision to the contrary, the alliance may be directed against the United States in case of American-Japanese difficulties, that it may be seized upon as a convenient instrument to force the Japanese immigration question, that it may so complicate the Pacific situation as to make limitation of armaments impossible, and that it may be used by Japan as a shield behind which to work out her designs in China. The Premiers of Canada and of South Africa have declared publicly, and in unmistakable language, that they would never consent to the renewal of the alliance in terms which may prove offensive to the United States.\*

✓ \* In a speech to the South African Assembly on May 20, shortly before his departure for the Imperial Conference of Dominion Premiers in London, General Smuts made the following striking remark apropos of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance: "There is no doubt that the position all over the world has changed vitally and fundamentally since 1902, when the treaty was concluded. Conditions have

Even Premier Hughes of Australia, who sees in the continuation of the alliance security for the British dominions in the Pacific, and therefore favours its renewal, has made it quite plain that the policy of "white Australia" must be insisted upon and that the new terms must be satisfactory to the United States. In other words, from the standpoint of the Dominion Premiers, the attitude of the United States is a pivotal fact in the consideration of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. They prefer co-operation with America to the continuation of the political partnership with Japan, and they are apparently willing and ready to sacrifice the alliance for the sake of the friendship of

changed completely, and I suppose if it was a question of entering into a new treaty to-day there would be little hesitation as to what conclusions the British Empire would come to; but it is the case of a treaty which was concluded many years ago, and which was renewed several times, and either the renewal or continuation of which now must raise very great questions indeed. I have said world conditions have altered. Since the treaty was entered into, Russia has disappeared as a trade power, and Germany also, for the time being. The position of Japan in the East has altered completely. She has a great position now in China, Siberia, and other parts, too. From a larger point of view also there is no doubt that since 1902 the friction between Japan and the western states of America has also increased, so that from all these points of view honourable members (referring to the members of the South African Assembly) will be able to see how very intricate the whole question is. What I would say in regard to the renewal of this treaty is that, to my mind, the paramount consideration that we ought to keep before us in the future, and in the very difficult times lying ahead of the world, is that it is essential, so far as possible, to secure understanding and co-operation between the British Empire and the United States. I consider that the second essential and cardinal principle of our foreign policy. In the first

the United States, with whose policy in regard to Japanese immigration they are in perfect accord.

Now, on the other hand, comparatively little or nothing has been said or heard about the position of the Chinese Government and the attitude of the Chinese towards this question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Not that the Chinese public opinion is inarticulate on the matter, not that the Chinese Government is indifferent to the future of the alliance or unconcerned with international problems having direct bearing upon its own interests, but that the voice of China, even in international matters concerning herself, is like a cry in the wilderness, unheard and unheeded. During

place, as I have said, I consider it necessary not to go in for any policy of antagonism on the Continent of Europe, but for a policy of peace; and in the second place I think, from a world point of view, the essential policy for the British Empire is to work with America to secure her co-operation, and in that way to go forward in the very difficult world task that lies before our Government."

Mr. Arthur Meighen, before his departure for the Imperial Conference, declared in the Canadian House of Commons: "The alliance is a subject of great and definite moment, and if there is one dominion to which, more than another, the question of the renewal is of importance, it is to the Dominion of Canada. I say that with particular reference to the relationship this Dominion bears, and must always bear, as a portion of the British Empire, standing—if I may say it—between Great Britain, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. I need not enlarge upon how serious, or even how momentous, is the deliberation that must take place as regards the question of the renewal of that treaty. The importance of it arises from the United States therein, and the interest of Great Britain and Australia and of other parts of the Empire; but the importance of it to us arises, in a very great degree, out of the very great interest of the United States in the renewal or non-renewal thereof."

the last two years, when the discussion on the Anglo-Japanese alliance has monopolised the columns of the newspapers in the Far East, the Chinese Government has made known, time and again, its position towards the continuation of the alliance. It has protested against the renewal of the alliance without China being consulted in the negotiation. But the British Government has not seen fit to make a formal reply to the protest, and at one time it has even refused to make public in England the text of the Chinese protest, while the same has been given out by the Chinese Foreign Office and widely published in China. The statesmen from the British Dominions, as we have seen, have waxed eloquent as to the need of co-operation with the United States and the necessity of taking American sentiment into account in the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Not a word, however, has fallen from their lips about China, whose interest in the matter has apparently never entered into their consideration. 'General Smuts, the South African statesman who sees the shifting of the centre of world politics to the Pacific, speaks of the alliance in terms of Japan, Great Britain and the United States, and does not seem to have noticed China on the map. Lloyd George, in expressing his hope for a Pacific understanding in the House of Commons, referred to China only when he was poignantly reminded of the existence of such a country in the Far East!

That China, like the United States, is greatly interested in the future of the alliance there can be no doubt. ' Like the United States, she objects to the renewal of the alliance, though largely for different reasons.' China objects to its renewal on the ground that it has often sacrificed her sovereign rights and interests which it is designed to safeguard, that it has frequently been used as a screen to cover attacks upon her integrity and independence which it undertakes nominally to protect, that it is diametrically opposed in spirit, if not in letter, to the principles of the Open Door which it professes to be among its objects to maintain, and that it is responsible for the outbreak of two wars in the Far East, although its avowed object is the maintenance of peace. The questions of armament, of immigration, and of the future British-American relations, that have influenced the opinion in the United States, do not enter into China's consideration. The interests of the United States in the future of the alliance grow out of the possibilities of danger that a renewal of the alliance would involve; they are largely indirect. The interests of China are those which are plainly stated in the alliance treaty; they are direct. While the opposition in the United States has apparently influenced the opinion of the Dominion statesmen at the Imperial Conference and consequently deferred action by the British Government on the continuation of the alliance, it is not known to what extent



the opposition by China has been responsible for its postponement.

Here we have a triangular dilemma, if it can be so called. Japan has been very anxious for an extension of the alliance, but has found obstacles in its way. Great Britain is not any too enthusiastic over the renewal of the alliance, but she is frankly unwilling to throw over her Far Eastern ally. And China—the one Power most vitally concerned in the matter—has protested loudly against the renewal of the alliance, but her words are discounted, unheeded, if not unheard. It is evident that each of the three Powers has its own preference in the matter, but none of them sees its way clear to realise it. Is there a solution of the dilemma? Or must the Anglo-Japanese alliance be forever consigned to the anomalous state wherein its incompatibility with the League Covenant is recognised, but its terms are said to remain in force?

An unusually happy alternative is found in President Harding's proposition for a conference on the limitation of armaments and on the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, which, though not very pleasing to Japan, is heartily welcomed by China and Great Britain. On July 10, just at the time when the world was in the dark as to what has become of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the following official statement was issued by the United States, giving reasons for the proposition of the confer-

ence and expressing hopes for its possible accomplishment:

"The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of powers heretofore known as the principal allied and associated powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference will be issued.

"It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned, and China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems."

This proposal for a conference on the limitation of armaments, which is also to discuss Pacific and Far Eastern problems, came as a timely relief to Great Britain, who has found herself in an embarrassing position because of the pressure by Japan on the one hand for the renewal of the alliance, and of the opposition by Canada and South Africa to

(its continuance on the other. China has welcomed the conference, for the fact that she is among the Powers invited assures her the opportunity of presenting her views on the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the disposition of which will certainly be one of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems to be discussed. To Japan, of course, this idea of an armament conference is not very pleasing, but she could ill afford to decline a proposal which has already been accepted by all the other Powers invited.

It may not be without interest to add here that, while the proposal is a welcomed invitation to Great Britain, it is by no means a surprise to her. In fact, the idea of a Pacific conference was germinated by British statesmen themselves, who have seen in it the desired opportunity of getting rid of the alliance without hurting Japanese susceptibilities too much. At the Imperial Conference, General Smuts expressed the opinion, which was warmly endorsed by Premier Massey of New Zealand, that the results to be expected from the renewal of the alliance could be secured equally well from a conference of the Powers interested in the Pacific. This idea was later brought out again and again in the debates in the Parliament. On July 7, in answer to a question as to the progress of the negotiation for the renewal of the alliance, Premier Lloyd George said that he was waiting to hear from China and the United States,

hinting directly at the negotiations then going on for the proposal of the Pacific conference. It is largely due to the initiative of the United States, however, that the proposal for the conference was finally formulated, and on July 10, announced.\* It is also due to the initiative of the United States that China, France and Italy have been invited to participate in the conference.†

The question now remains: what action will the conference take in regard to the Anglo-Japanese alliance? Will Japan and Great Britain be allowed to renew the compact in its present form, or with modifications? Can a general agreement be reached by all the Powers interested in the Pacific and the Far East so as to take the place of the alliance? Italy and France are but slightly interested in the question. The future of the alliance depends as much upon the wishes of China and the United States as upon those of the contracting Powers themselves.

\* Prior to the issuance of the proposal, President Harding, in a letter to Mr. Mondell, the Republican leader in the House, appealed for an expression of opinion favourable to the limitation of armaments through international agreement. The Borah amendment, which had previously passed the Senate, authorising the President to invite Japan and Great Britain to a conference for the purpose of reducing their naval expenditures for the next five years, was, as a result of the appeal, also passed in the House on June 29 by a vote of 330 to 4. The passage of the amendment by such a large majority must have encouraged the President in making "informal but definite inquiries" about the conference on the limitation of armaments.

† Belgium, Holland, and Spain have also been invited to participate in the discussions on the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

## II

### THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902

**P**OLITICS makes strange bed-fellows, it has been often observed. If this is true with individuals, it is equally true with nations. Or, how can we account for the conclusion of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain in 1902?

The story of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has all the elements of a romance. Born out of a common desire of Japan and Great Britain to defend their vital interests in the Far East, which were being seriously menaced towards the end of the nineteenth century by the slow but steady encroachment by Russia in Manchuria, North China, and Korea, it was not, however, consummated until a series of political vicissitudes and diplomatic reverses, which both Powers had suffered, convinced them of the community of their interests and the advantages of a defensive alliance.

It is an open secret that, long before ever considering Japan as a worthy partner, Great Britain had riveted her eyes upon China, whom she had regarded as a potential ally, rich, populous, and strong enough to cope with the Russian Colossus. These two countries, Russia and Great Britain, had been traditional enemies. Their interests conflicted

in the Far East, in the Middle East, and in the Near East.<sup>1</sup> Russia was in secret alliance with France ever since 1891, and with the assistance of her ally, she was able to have everything very much in her own way, in Europe as well as in the East.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, without a political partner, Great Britain was forced to play a lone hand in all Eastern affairs.<sup>1</sup> It was then, as it is to-day, a cardinal point of the British foreign policy to defend British interests in India at all cost.<sup>1</sup> The Russian menace to the security of India occupied the attention of all British diplomats and statesmen.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, easily understandable why Great Britain had looked upon China as a possible and potential ally.<sup>1</sup>

In 1894 broke out the Chino-Japanese War in which China was badly defeated.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese giant was shown to be built with feet of clay, unable to stand up in the defence of her own interests, not to say those of Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> There was no doubt that Great Britain was disappointed in the absolute feebleness of China not suspected before, but she found encouragement in the discovery that, in the Far East, there was at least one Power whose growing strength might yet be turned to good account.\*

\* "The Anglo-Japanese alliance would have been an Anglo-Chinese alliance, if China had won the Sino-Japanese War," said Mr. Tang Shaoyi, in an interview with a special correspondent of the *New York Tribune*, which was published in that paper, under a Shanghai date, June 12, 1920. "Great



Following the Chino-Japanese War was a period of international scramble in which Russia was the most conspicuous figure. With the establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the commencement of the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Russian influence in Manchuria began to assume the most menacing aspect. Her lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan only served to make her influence more complete, and her position in Manchuria more impregnable. Now keenly realising that it was to the interest of British commerce that Manchuria should not fall into the hands of Russia, Great Britain began to place herself in readiness to meet the Muscovite challenge. She looked around once again for a diplomatic partner, and her choice could not have been more unfortunate. Germany was picked as her help-mate in the struggle against Russia. On October 16, 1900, the Anglo-German agreement, commonly called the "Yangtze Valley agreement" in Germany, was concluded and signed by Lord

Britain made overtures to China shortly before the Sino-Japanese War through her minister to Peking, Mr. MacDonald. He asked China to enter into an understanding with Great Britain. China at that time was afraid of Russia, and the Peking Government did not wish to make any entangling alliances. Then came the Sino-Japanese War, and Great Britain watched carefully to see which nation would become the better ally. To the victor belonged the alliance, and Japan won the war. MacDonald was immediately transferred from Peking to the Embassy at Tokio. The result was the Anglo-Japanese alliance. That is a point that has not been touched upon in tracing the origin of the Anglo-Japanese alliance."

Salisbury on behalf of Great Britain and Count Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador at London, on behalf of Germany. From the British point of view, the agreement was entered into with implicit understanding of being used as an instrument to checkmate Russian advances in Manchuria. The United States was invited to join, but the invitation was declined. <sup>1</sup> Japan saw advantage in the agreement, and adhered to it as one of its original signatories. <sup>2</sup>

Nothing was further from the intention of Germany, however, than to use the agreement, as Japan and Great Britain both thought it could be used, as an instrument to checkmate Russian activities in Manchuria. <sup>3</sup> On March 15, 1901, von Bülow, then Chancellor of Germany, declared before the Reichstag that "the Anglo-German agreement had no reference to Manchuria," <sup>4</sup> where Germany had no political or economic interest to speak of. Germany refused, therefore, to apply the agreement to Manchuria. <sup>5</sup>

With this refusal, no doubt, both Japan and Great Britain were sadly disappointed. The two Powers were thus driven to look for new diplomatic partners. But, in view of the political situation existing then, what countries would be willing to join their hands? <sup>6</sup> Russia was the very Power whose moves on the Manchurian field both Japan and Great Britain were more anxious to check. <sup>7</sup> Germany, much preferred by Japan as an ally be-

cause of her military strength, proved such a disappointment that, unless she could show a considerable change of heart, it was absolutely futile to approach her again.\* For France there was no consideration at all as a political partner, for, through her alliance with Russia, she was tied hard and fast to the wheels of Russian diplomacy in the Near East as well as in the Far East. Italy might be willing to join hands either with Japan or with Great Britain. Owing to the comparatively insignificant amount of material interest she had in China, however, and owing to the relatively small diplomatic influence that she could exert in Peking, any political combination with Italy would contribute very little indeed to the ultimate realisation of the aims which Japan and Great Britain had in view. And the only Power vitally interested in the affairs in China and capable of being an effective ally of Japan and Great Britain in the Far East was the United States. But the United States, as everybody knows, had then, as she has to-day, a greater respect for the injunctions which Washington and Jefferson had handed down of keeping away from entangling alliances than for international political combinations, which constituted an essential part of the state system of Europe, but not of America. Apparently, therefore, there was a dearth of suitable partners, who could join the hands either of Japan, or of Great Britain, or of both, in their endeavour to protect their political

and economic interests in China seriously menaced by Russian designs.

In the face of such a situation, two alternatives were possible. Both Japan and Great Britain could endeavour to effect an understanding with Russia, so as to avoid all possible causes of conflict. If they should fail in this attempt, or if they should deem it impossible and impracticable, they could bring about a combination between themselves for the purposes which they had in view.

Now it was an open secret that in Japan there were at that time two groups of statesmen, holding very different views in regard to her international policy. { One group, composed of Marquis Ito, Count Inouye, Count Katsura, and Marquis Yamagata, and other influential members of the Genro, was strongly in favour of coming to an understanding with Russia herself, respecting their mutual ambitions and aims in Manchuria and Korea. } The { other group, composed of Count Hayashi, Count Komura, Viscount Sone, and other political leaders of less prominence, was pro-British in sentiment, and was, therefore, most strenuous in their endeavour to effect an Anglo-Japanese understanding. } The first group held the opinion that questions concerning Korea and Manchuria could be best settled between Japan and Russia alone, and that any political arrangement without taking Russia into consideration was no settlement at all. The { Elder statesmen were not, at any rate, prepared

to go into an alliance with Great Britain. It was their belief that, in view of the traditional policy of isolation of Great Britain, it was most unlikely that Japan could rely upon her for assistance in time of need. On the other hand, the younger statesmen of Japan were firm in their belief that any satisfactory understanding was impossible with Russia, and that the only way to bring her to terms was to conclude an alliance with Great Britain whose interests in China and Korea were said to be identical with those of Japan.

Rightly or wrongly, they believed that, if Russia were faithful in her international obligations, the Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol of May 28, 1896, and the Rosen-Nissi Agreement of April 13, 1898, which, were, as far as Japan was concerned, still satisfactory, should be faithfully observed by both Powers. The fact that Russia had been playing fast and loose with them indicated how little her words could be trusted.

‘In England, the opinion was equally divided. On the one hand, it was maintained that Great Britain should continue her policy of isolation and independence, keeping her hands free, remaining the absolute master of her own fate, and trusting to her own force for the protection of her political and economic interests in China.’ It was pointed out that, if any understanding could be arrived at with Russia, it would be well and good, and if it were not possible, any arrangement with Japan re-



sembling anything like an alliance would be a perpetual source of provocation to Russia. Besides, the idea of ever entering into a diplomatic combination with Japan was said to be most "un-English," and no matter whatever its plausible objects might be, an Anglo-Japanese alliance would be bound to incur the severe condemnation of the whole Christendom. On the other hand, the opinion was equally strong that new factors of international politics demanded a re-consideration of Great Britain's traditional foreign policy. The fact that she was without an ally in any part of the world, upon whom she could rely for help and assistance in the protection of her imperial interests, suggested most strongly the advisability of effecting a partnership with the rising Power of the Far East, whose strength could not be questioned.

This opinion was held by a large number of British statesmen, and was most eloquently voiced by Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, in a speech in the House of Commons on the conduct of British foreign policy. "It must have occurred to every one," he said on March 1, 1898, "that, during the past five years—since 1893—this country has been steadily pushed down-hill in many parts of Africa, in Asia, and in other quarters of the globe. There is not a single case that I know of in which this country has been able to make effective response to foreign encroachment or aggression. I need only mention Africa—West, Central, East, and



South—Madagascar, Siam, Tunis, the North Western frontier of India, China, South and North, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean. Everywhere there has been British retreat and British repulse. Why is this? It is not the result of accident. There are two reasons for it. In the first place, the deliberate attack, or encroachment, which has been made upon British interests by the great Russo-French combination which has been and is being felt everywhere; and in the second place, the injurious and insane, and the most mischievous change of policy which took place in 1893, when this country began alienating its ancient allies, which has left it in a state of practical isolation ever since. It is the fact that ever since 1893 we have not had a single ally in either Eastern or Western Europe, or elsewhere, that is necessary to our foreign policy, and, until that great mistake is retrieved, until we return to the ancient alliances of this country, which are based not on sentimental imagination or popular outcry, but upon mutual and common interests, there is no hope that this country will succeed.”

“We have heard the splendid isolation of England, but England cannot, against an armed Europe, stand alone; England, with the richest and most coveted possessions in the world, must be a prey to the ambitions of other nations.” And then he went on to point out the impossibility of Great Britain facing alone the great combination of Rus-

sia and France, and possibly of Germany, and emphasising the fact that in Japan, the rising Power in the Far East, Great Britain could find a political partner, whose interests in Korea and China were more or less like those of her own. "I consider," he continued, "the rise of the Japanese power in the East has been very providential for this country. I do not know what our position would have been now if we had to face a combination of Russia and France, and possibly of Germany as well, in the Far East. There is a very great and strong power growing up in Japan, and by the help of Japan alone can we retain our position in the Northern Pacific." And Sir Ellis also emphasised the point that by concluding an alliance with Japan, the position of Great Britain in the Far East would become practically invincible. "By sea, the English and Japanese fleets are absolute masters of the position. By land, with the aid of the Japanese army, we are equally masters of the position." It was with this obvious result in view that Sir Ellis, like so many of his countrymen at that time, urged the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance.

While both Japan and Great Britain were yet uncertain as to the wisdom of such a novel combination, balancing in their minds the advantages and disadvantages that were likely to ensue therefrom, the political events in the Far East were moving at such vertiginous speed as to allow but little time for hesitation or deliberation. The lease

by Russia of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan was immediately followed by the lease of Wei-hai-wei by Great Britain for as long a period as Russia would remain in Port Arthur. The animosity between the two Powers was aggravated by their struggles for railway and mining concessions in China, and it took on the colour of actual hostility against each other, when Russia, in consequence of the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, occupied South Manchuria and disregarded the treaty rights of British subjects and of the other nationals in the region. Japan was also alarmed by Russian activities in Korea, where she had claimed paramount interest. The attempt by Russia, though futile in its result, to lease a Korean port commanding the Japanese Strait, served to intensify the fear which the Japanese Government and people had alike of Muscovite designs. And the repeated failure on the part of Russia to keep her promise to withdraw her troops from Manchuria, and the invidious diplomacy which she had adopted in her dealings with the feeble Government at Peking—diplomacy of the kind given expression in the Alexieff-Tseng Agreement, the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Agreement, and in M. Lessar's demands in August, 1901, exasperated not only China, who was weak and had therefore but little to say, but also Japan and Great Britain, who were anxious to protect their own rights and interests.

All these events served more and more to

estrangle Russia from Japan and Great Britain, and at the same time, drew the latter Powers closer and closer together. The repudiation by Germany of the Anglo-German Agreement of October 16, 1900, by refusing to apply it to Manchuria, drove the two Powers into each other's arms.<sup>1</sup> They realised that there was a dearth of suitable partners, and that if any political combination were to be effected, it could be made only between themselves. They looked each other squarely in the face, and decided, owing to a strange community of interests in China, to bind each other in a defensive alliance. The result was the conclusion, after numerous exchanges of views between the two Governments, of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of January 30, 1902.<sup>2</sup>

It is needless to add that the alliance would not have been so easily brought about had it not been for the new factors coming in for consideration. In the first place, it should be noted that Count Tadasu Hayashi, one of the most enthusiastic exponents of an Anglo-Japanese understanding, was appointed Japanese Minister at the Court of St. James. His diplomatic position afforded him the necessary opportunity to discuss with Lord Lansdowne, Lord Salisbury, and other members of the British Government the possibility as well as the advisability of coming to a binding understanding between the two countries. These discussions were, of course, carried on by Count Hayashi on his own

initiative, though with the knowledge and approval of his home Government. And the second factor in the situation, which accelerated the negotiations on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was the mission to Europe, headed by no less a personage than 'Marquis Ito,' the foremost statesman of Japan at that time. ¶ It was generally assumed that he had in his pocket a proposal for a Russo-Japanese understanding, which he was to take up with the Russian Government upon his arrival at St. Petersburg. Officially, Marquis Ito took this trip for the purpose of improving his health; but the fact that he was to go to St. Petersburg during the Winter of 1901—the Russian capital which enjoys no particular reputation as a health resort, especially in the Winter season, belied his ostensible purpose. Indeed, the British Government was frankly fearful that Japan might negotiate an alliance with Russia before the Anglo-Japanese negotiations could be brought to a successful end. ¶

Sagacious diplomat as he was, Count Hayashi was quick to play the trump card that was placed in his hands. ¶ "I came to the conclusion," he admitted in his own Memoirs, "that the British statesmen sincerely desired an alliance treaty, but were fearful of the conclusion of a convention between Japan and Russia. ¶ I thought, therefore, that we might take advantage of that fear on England's part, and by pretending that an agreement would be negotiated with 'Russia hasten on the conclusion



of the treaty with Great Britain.”\* The pretence was used with great effect. After a few exchanges of views as to the preliminary draft, the treaty was finally concluded on January 30, 1902. In coming to the agreement, the Governments of Japan and Great Britain were said to be “actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East,” “the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea,” and “equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations.” Among other things, it recognised the independence of China and Korea; it admitted the rights of Japan and Great Britain to “take such measures as may be indispensable” in order to safeguard their “special interests” in China and Korea; it provided for the neutrality of Great Britain in case Japan was involved in war with one *single* Power, and for British assistance when more than one Power joined in hostilities against Japan. Lord Lansdowne was asked to explain “why under this agreement do you undertake to protect Japan in the defence of the interests which are recognised under the agreement if she be attacked by two Powers, whereas you do not undertake to come to her assistance if she be attacked by only one Power?” In reply, he said: “The answer seemed to me to be an obvious one. We desire to protect

\* A. M. Pooley, “The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi,” p. 129.



Japan against what we may conceive to be the greatest peril which might menace her and that would certainly be a coalition of other Powers. Japan has a strong Navy and a strong Army, and might very fairly expect to hold her own in a single-handed encounter with any other Power; but if she were to be threatened with an attack by more than one Power she would undoubtedly be in imminent peril; and it is in that imminent peril that we desire to come to her succour."

In this connection, it may be of interest to know how the alliance was received in the Parliament and how the statesmen responsible for its conclusion defended it. Lord Lansdowne, in answer to a question put to him in the House of Lords on February 13, 1902, as to the reasons why Great Britain thus abandoned her traditional policy of isolation, said:

"I think it is true that in recent years international agreements involving assistance on the part of this country to other Powers have been generally regarded with considerable suspicion and misgiving; but I say frankly we are not going to be deterred by these considerations, or to admit for a moment that because this Agreement does involve a new departure it is therefore open to adverse criticism.

"I do not think that any one can have watched the recent course of events in different parts of the world without realising that many of the arguments which

a generation ago might have been adduced in support of a policy of isolation have ceased to be entitled to the same consideration now. What do we see on all sides? We observe a tendency on the part of the great Powers to form groups. ' We observe a tendency to over-increasing naval and military armaments involving ever-increasing burdens upon the people for the defence of whose countries these armaments are accumulated. There is also this—that in these days war breaks out with a suddenness which was unknown in former days, when nations were not, as they are now, armed to the teeth and ready to enter on hostilities at any moment. ' When we consider these features of international situation, we must surely feel that that country would indeed be endowed with an extraordinary amount of what I might call self-sufficiency which took upon itself to say that it would accept, without question, without reservation, the doctrine that all foreign alliances were to be avoided as necessarily embarrassing and objectionable. Therefore I would entreat your Lordships to look at this matter strictly on its merits, and not to allow your judgment to be swayed by any musty formulas or old-fashioned superstitions as to the desirability of pursuing a policy of isolation for this country. If considered on its merits, I venture to suggest that what you have to take into account in regard to an alliance of this kind is, first, whether the ally is a desirable ally, and in the next place whether the objects of the alliance are commendable, and last, but not least, whether the price you pay for the alliance is greater than you ought to pay. If these questions can be satis-

factorily answered, then I say the alliance is not a bad thing for the country, but, on the contrary, is a good thing; for *prima facie* if there be no countervailing objections, the country which has the good fortune to possess allies is more to be envied than the country which is without them."

Lord Lansdowne did not take upon himself to show that as an ally Japan was desirable, but he simply reminded the House that that nation had been in the past referred to in the warmest terms. He then went on to answer the other two questions which he had set before the House:

"Then as to the object of the alliance. They are stated very clearly on the face of the Agreement. They are, in the first place, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East; in the second place, they are the maintenance of that commercial policy which is for convenience usually described as the policy of the open door; and I think I may say that the third object of the Agreement is the maintenance of that which seems to me to be a very valuable interest to us indeed—the maintenance of peace of that part of the world to which the Agreement applies. These are not objects desired by this country alone. I believe I shall be correct when I say, speaking in general terms, that the whole of the great Powers with whom we have been in constant communication in the last few years in regard to the affairs of China, that all of these Powers have at one time or another given their adhesion to the policy of the *status quo* and the policy of equal

commercial opportunities for all countries in the Far East.

"There is, therefore, nothing in this Agreement that does violence to the policy which has been accepted by other great Powers. Then is it the case that we are paying an excessive price for this alliance? I understood the noble Earl (Spencer) to say that he well understood our feelings towards Japan, but that he was unable to understand why it was necessary to resort to an international agreement of this description in order to give effect to our policy. Well, my Lords, I venture to say that if it is indeed our policy to support Japan, to protect against the danger of a coalition of other Powers, I do not think we can avow it too frankly or too distinctly; and, to my mind, there is a much greater danger in leaving important questions of international policy of this kind to vague and hazy understandings than there is in embodying them explicitly in an Agreement, the purport of which cannot possibly be misunderstood by those concerned."

In a covering despatch to Sir Claude MacDonald, at that time British Minister at Tokio, Lord Lansdowne said: "This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome of the events which have taken place during the past two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.\* This statement was not quite ac-

\* The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902: Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and Korea, signed at London, January 30, 1902. *Vide* also Appendix B.

curate. Whatever might have been the immediate cause of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance—of which there were many, as we have shown above, it was admitted on all hands that the genesis of the alliance went further back than two years. As a matter of fact, the Anglo-Japanese flirtations had been going on in no uncertain fashion even before the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War, when Great Britain made up her mind that China was not strong enough to be trusted as an ally against the Muscovites. At that time, international philandering was of the most Platonic sort, and no concrete result was expected therefrom. In 1895, Great Britain refused to take part in the three-Powers intervention to keep Japan out of Liaotung peninsula. A year before, Great Britain consented to a revision of her treaties with Japan, and to the abolition of the extra-territorial jurisdiction, thus according her a cordial and full recognition of her place among the family of nations. In return for these favours, Japan was willing to withdraw her troops from Wei-hai-wei so as to make it possible for British occupation. In 1899, Japan exerted her influence to arrange for a British concession in Newchwang. And in 1900, upon the outbreak of the Boxer Insurrection, the two Powers conducted themselves in perfect harmony, both during the campaign and throughout the negotiations for peace. In the year following, negotiation for the conclusion of the alliance was

taken up by Count Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne, with the result already known.

!The Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty was said to be a remarkable document, "the like of which is seldom seen in history, especially when it is considered that it united reciprocally two nations widely apart in race, religion, and history, one of which had rarely in time of peace entered into a regular alliance with a European Power." \*! It was truly said that for the first time in her history that Great Britain had concluded a defensive alliance of this sort with a foreign Power, and indeed it was the first time in modern history of the world that a European Power had concluded an alliance, not with an Occidental, but with an Oriental Power.

But what effect or effects did the alliance have upon the general course of events in the Far East? How were the Contracting Powers benefited by it? What bearing did it have upon the future of China? And how much did it contribute to the maintenance of the Open Door policy? All international agreements, this and the others to come, in order to ascertain their true purport, must be analysed to answer these questions.

Speaking of the effects of the alliance as far as Japan was concerned, we cannot do any better than quoting a Japanese writer, Dr. T. Iyenaga, who has been for years a semi-official spokesman for the

\* K. Asakawa, "The Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 202.



Japanese Government in the United States, and the Director of the East and West News Bureau in New York City. }“Leaving the treatment of the effects of the treaty on England to English writers, from a Japanese standpoint it seems that the agreement safeguards Japan’s position in Korea, it greatly relieves her from working under the nightmare of a European coalition against her, it enhances her advice (*sic*) with that of England at the Court of Peking, and it adds to the weight of whatever Japan may undertake to do in foreign relations.” \*† Indeed, it would come as a natural consequence of the consummation of the alliance that Japan, having thus allied herself with a world Power, or with “the strongest naval Power” in the world then, would take her full part in the game of world politics.

On the other hand, the advantages which Great Britain hoped for from the alliance were not so definable. Generally speaking, it helped to improve her diplomatic prestige abroad, and placed her in a well fortified position where she could direct her offensive and defensive operations. It has been generally held, but very erroneously, that from the British point of view, the object of the alliance was to provide against a Russian invasion in India. This was the avowed object of the second and the third alliances, with which we shall deal in later chapters, but certainly not that of the first alliance

\* *The American Review of Reviews*, April, 1902, p. 461.

treaty (the text may be found in the appendix), in which not a word was said about India at all. In fact, according to Count Hayashi's memoirs, India was purposely excluded from the sphere of operation of the alliance on the ground that, inasmuch as Japan had no material interests there, to include the British Indian Empire in the scope of the alliance would mean too much responsibility for her. The alliance, it is true, was directed against Russia; but the published version of the treaty gives no ground for thinking or believing that it provided against Russian menace to India. On the very contrary, it was distinctly stated in the treaty that the "special interests" of Great Britain related "principally to China." An English writer, whose competency to speak on such a subject has been well recognised, observed that from the British point of view, the making of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 "was a wise and necessary measure, intended to check the encroachments of Russia upon Northern China and to safeguard our commercial interests in that region." \*

But the question remains: How was Great Britain benefited by the alliance? Did the combination with the Island Empire of the East really improve the prestige of the Island Empire of the West? "In general," it was shrewdly observed, "an alliance does not add to a nation's prestige;

\* J. O. P. Bland, "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 291.

it is a confession of weakness rather than an evidence of strength.”\* The alliance was attracted by the rising power in Japan, and, as Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett had observed, by the prospect that, through a naval and military combination, both Powers would be placed in an invincible position.

That the alliance was directed against Russia and against her sinister activities in Northern China and Korea was well realised by herself and by her ally. This was evidenced by the sardonic declaration by the Governments of Russia and France, which the conclusion of the alliance elicited. The two Governments, after due consultation on the subject, made this declaration on March 17, 1902:

“The allied Governments of Russia and France have received a copy of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 30th January, 1902, concluded with the object of maintaining the *status quo* and the general peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all nations, and have been fully satisfied to find therein affirmed the fundamental principles which they have themselves, on several occasions, declared to form the basis of their policy, and still remain so.

“The two Governments consider that the observance of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East.

\* Prof. Edwin Maxey, “The Arena,” May, 1902, p. 453.

Nevertheless, being obliged themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of disturbances in China jeopardising the integrity and free development of that Power, might become a menace to their own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests."

The St. Petersburg *Messenger Officiel* published three days later (March 20, 1901) the Franco-Russian Declaration, together with an official statement that the Government of Russia, in spite of the comments in diplomatic circles and in some of the continental newspapers to the contrary, had received the announcement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance "with the most perfect calm" and had accorded it the most cordial reception inasmuch as the object of the alliance was the very one which Russia had always insisted upon, namely, the preservation of the independence and integrity of China and Korea. "Russia desires the preservation of the *status quo*," the statement continued to say, "and general peace in the Far East, by the construction of the great Siberian Railroad, together with its branch line through Manchuria, toward a port always ice-free. Russia aids in the extension in these regions of the commerce and industry of the whole world. Would it be to her interest to put forward obstacles at the present time? The

intention expressed by Great Britain and Japan to attain those same objects, which have invariably been pursued by the Russian Government, can meet with nothing but sympathy in Russia, in spite of the comments in certain political spheres and in some of the foreign newspapers, which endeavoured to present in quite a different light the impassive attitude of the Imperial Government toward a diplomatic act which, in its eyes, does not change in any way the general situation of the political horizon."

This Russian statement was significant for it explained what Russia had conceived to be the *status quo* in the extreme East, that the Contracting Parties of the alliance expressed it to be their desire to maintain. "We have each of us desired," said Lord Lansdowne in his covering letter to Sir MacDonald, "that the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the territorial *status quo* either in China or in the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained." In other words, what Great Britain had meant by *status quo* was the maintenance of the *territorial* and commercial conditions existing in China, and in the adjoining



regions. What Russia had understood by *status quo* was the preservation of the special rights and privileges which she had in Manchuria and Northern China. It was curious that the Russian Government did not interpret the *status quo* as to mean continuous occupation by Russian forces of Manchuria. At the time when the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concluded, January 30, 1902, the Russian troops were still in occupation of Manchuria. In the absence of a clear definition of the *status quo*, Russia would have more than legitimate ground if she should decide to continue her occupation of Manchuria in order to be in conformity with the avowed object of the alliance!

The most striking, as well as the most important for our purpose, of the provisions of the alliance treaty and of its objects, was the ostensible attempt by the Contracting Parties to preserve the independence and integrity of China and to maintain equal opportunities "for the commerce and industry of all nations." How far they were successful in this attempt is a question, which cannot be answered at this stage of our narrative without anticipating the long train of events. For our purpose, it is sufficient to say here, that the Anglo-Japanese alliance, whatever might be said for or against it, and whatever might be its hidden or open motives, was to us nothing less than an assertion of Japanese and British spheres of interest in China, an open challenge to Russia, and a distinct



violation of the spirit of the Open Door policy. It was true, indeed, that the High Contracting Parties "recognised the independence of China and Korea" and declared themselves "to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country." But did they not also declare that, in view of their special interests in China and Korea, "the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power or by *disturbances arising in China or Korea?*" Such a provision might be in the interest of the Contracting Parties, but it was highly dangerous to the sovereign rights of China and Korea. When carried to its logical conclusion, the provision was nothing less than a mutual recognition that both Contracting Parties would have a free hand in taking whatever measures necessary to protect their special interests, in disregard of the independence and the sovereignty of China and Korea. If a revolution should break out in China, which injured the allied interests in the country, Japan and Great Britain, according to the alliance, would consider it "admissible" for either of them, or both, "to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests." In other words, they would consider it "admissible" to intervene in any domestic disturbance in China! And if Russia should continue

her occupation of Newchwang permanently, Japan and Great Britain would, according to this understanding, also seize other ports of China to balance the power and to protect their special interests! Could such a spirit be reconciled with the avowed object of the alliance, which seeks to maintain the administrative independence and territorial integrity of China so as to provide equal opportunities for commerce and industry for all nations in the world? Both Japan and Great Britain unctuously declared that they were "specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China" and "in securing equal opportunities" for all nations. And these very same Powers pledged each other a free hand to do whatever each saw fit in case of foreign aggression or internal disturbance in China. A free hand could only mean intervention, and intervention in the domestic affairs of China would nullify the very independence, and in many cases, impair the very integrity, the maintenance of which they professed to be "specially interested" in!

### III

## THE SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

THE alliance of 1902 would have lasted without renewal till the beginning of 1907, and could not have been terminated by either party without twelve months' notice to the other. The Japanese Government, seeing that the war with Russia was drawing to an end, thought it wise to take time by the forelock and have it renewed immediately.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 bore little or no resemblance to that of three years ago. It was virtually a new instrument altogether. Designed for an entirely different set of purposes and objects, and intended to meet diplomatic contingencies not provided for in the original document, the second alliance could hardly be said to be a renewal of the old.

The alliance was negotiated at London between Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi prior to the meeting of the Peace Conference at Portsmouth between Japan and Russia. When President Roosevelt offered the good offices of the United States, and when the belligerent Powers agreed to treat

for peace, the statesmen at Tokio were quick to see the advantages of a new and strengthened alliance with Great Britain, which would not only fortify her position at the forthcoming peace conference, but also insure her against the revival of any combination of European Powers such as that which she was confronted with at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War. Count Hayashi, under instructions from the Government at Tokio, immediately began negotiations with the British Foreign Minister, the result of which was the signature of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance on the 12th of August, 1905, exactly three days after the peace negotiations at Portsmouth were commenced. Although the text of the agreement was not published at the time, it was no secret with the Russian delegates at the Peace Conference that a new alliance had been entered into between Japan and Great Britain. What influence it had upon the conduct of the peace negotiations was not definitely known, however.

The new alliance was designed to replace the agreement concluded between Japan and Great Britain on the 30th of January, 1902. It had as its objects (1) the consolidation and maintenance of peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, (2) the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring her independence and integrity and the maintenance of the Open Door policy, and (3) the maintenance of the

territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the Far East and India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions. It was agreed that, if these interests and rights were menaced, the Contracting Parties would communicate with each other fully and frankly and would take common measures to safeguard them; and that, if either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of these rights and interests, the other would come at once to the assistance of her ally and conduct the war in common. As Japan possessed paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognised her right to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she deemed proper and necessary to safeguard and to advance those interests, provided always such measures were not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations. On the other hand, as Great Britain had a special interest in the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognised her right to take such measures as she found necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. The alliance was to remain in force for ten years after the date of its signature.

That the terms of the new treaty were entirely different from those of the old was apparent. It is not quite accurate, therefore, to speak of the new alliance as a renewal of the old. To call it a revision, it is nearer to the truth. To emphasise the

difference between the two, we need only contrast the terms of the two agreements.

In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty of 1902 was to run for five years, and thereafter until one year after either Contracting Power should have denounced it. "But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance *ipso facto* shall continue until peace shall have been concluded." But the new treaty was to run for ten years, although with the same provisions for its termination. The first alliance was strictly defensive, inasmuch as it provided that, in case either of the Contracting Parties should become involved in war, the other would maintain "a strict neutrality" and would use her best efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against her ally, and that she would go to the assistance of her ally only when the ally was attacked by more than one Power. The new alliance was much broader in scope, as it provided that war with one Power should be sufficient cause for common action. It was of course understood that such a war must not be aggressively provoked by either of the Contracting Parties, and must be a war in defence of their territorial rights and special interests in China, India, and Korea. In the first agreement, India was purposely left out upon the demand of the Japanese Government; but the scope of the new treaty extended to India as well as to "Eastern



Asia." In concluding the alliance of 1902, the Governments of Japan and Great Britain, it was pointed out, were "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East." Although the maintenance of general peace was still included among the purposes of the revised treaty, it was not known that the Contracting Parties were still actuated by the desire to maintain the *status quo* in the Far East. This change of heart was perhaps due to the fact that Japan had won the war against Russia. To continue to respect the *status quo* as provided for in the first alliance agreement would be to permit Russia to remain in Port Arthur and Talienwan, and to deny Japan herself the right to take over the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and to succeed to the Russian economic concessions in South Manchuria. And, lastly, it may also be observed, that, in 1902, Great Britain and Japan were "specially interested in maintaining the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." The second alliance, however, referred only to the independence and integrity of China and the maintenance of the Open Door policy in that country. The independence and the integrity of Korea were entirely overlooked.

In addition to these differences which are dis-

cernible from the published terms of both treaties, we may also note, in passing, a few less conspicuous but none the less important elements that distinguish the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 from that of 1902. It was an open secret that, while the old agreement was directed against Russia and against her only, the revised treaty was meant not only for Russia who was still a menace to the security of the British India, but also for Germany, who, because of the rapid increase and expansion of her military and naval forces, threatened the balance of power in Europe. In fact, the second alliance marked the beginning of the series of international agreements,\* which were designed, nominally for the purpose of maintaining the Open Door policy in China and her territorial integrity, but really for the purpose of "encircling" Germany in the diplomatic world. And then it may also be observed that the old alliance was more favourable to Japan than to Great Britain, as it prevented France from joining in the hostilities against her. To Great Britain, the new alliance, covering not only a common sphere of interest in the Far East, but also India, was at least in this one respect more favourable than the old. It freed her from constant anxiety concerning the future of her greatest dependency, and "allies her more intimately with

\* The Franco-Japanese Agreement, 1907; the Russo-Japanese Agreement, 1907; the Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907, etc.

a nation which has shown itself to be a military and naval Power of the first rank."

As has been noticed, the objects of the alliance were to preserve peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, to maintain the Open Door policy "by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China," and to safeguard the "territorial rights" and "special interests" of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. With the first object we have nothing to quarrel. It may be noted, however, that the alliance of 1902 had a similar declaration. The fact that it had failed absolutely to maintain peace in the Far East showed most clearly the real worth of such a declaration. The second object was plausible, for it was ostensibly a reiteration of their desire for the maintenance of the Open Door policy in China. "But its meaning would have been clearer had the characteristic bit of diplomatic humbug been omitted. Instead of its object being 'the preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China,' it is, of course, the preservation in China and the far and Middle East of the interests of Great Britain and Japan. The phrasing almost amounts to an impertinence, since none of the other Powers have asked England and Japan to take care of their interests in that part of the world, and none of them would be at all disposed

to admit greater competence on the part of these two Powers to look after other national interests than is possessed by the other nation themselves." At any rate, the profession for the Open Door by the Contracting Parties was stultified by their avowed purpose of maintaining and defending their "territorial rights" and "special interests" in India and in the Far East. What were these "territorial rights" and "special interests?" Who were to define them? Special interests are incompatible with the principle of the Open Door. To insist on the one is to nullify the other. It is easy to understand that the "territorial rights" of Great Britain in the regions of Eastern Asia and India referred to her possessions of India, of Burma, and of Hongkong, and possibly to her lease of Wei-hai-wei. But what were the "territorial rights" of Japan in the said regions? In India, she had none; in Eastern Asia, she had not yet acquired any at the time of the conclusion of the second alliance. It is true that Port Arthur and the Kwangtung peninsula were occupied by the Japanese forces at the time; it is also true that Japan had also occupied the Sakhalin Island. In these regions, however, Japan could have no other territorial rights than those involved in military occupation. The Russo-Japanese War was not yet brought to the end when, on August 12, 1905, the new alliance treaty was signed at London. The peace conference at Portsmouth had commenced but for three days, and it was not

known what form the peace treaty would take. Even the international law principle of *uti possidetis*—the principle which legalises the state of territorial possession at the moment of the conclusion of peace, unless stipulations to the contrary are contained in the treaty—could not, therefore, be held to be operative. In Korea, Japan had not yet acquired any territorial rights. In spite of the fact that the country was overrun by Japanese forces and placed under Japanese military occupation, Korea was still an independent nation. At the time of the conclusion of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance, therefore, Japan did not possess a foot of territory, either by acquisition, by lease, or by conquest, on the continent of Asia. It is difficult to see why Great Britain should go out of her way to undertake the maintenance for her ally of the “territorial rights” of which Japan had none, and was not likely to have any if Russia should have stood firm and if China should have refused to consent to the transfer of the territorial leases in Manchuria from one belligerent Power to another.

The real importance of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance was, at any rate, not to be found in the meaningless provision for the maintenance of the Open Door policy. Although many have been led to believe that the Open Door was the fundamental principle, upon which the foundation of the alliance rested, the truth was that the inclusion



of the principle was designed to deprive the alliance of its sting, and to win for it the applause of the world. It was a gratuitous declaration, devoid of sincerity of purpose of ever carrying it out. In the light of the events that took place in China in general, and in Manchuria in particular, immediately after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese conflict, and in view of the repeated violations by Japan of the principle of equal opportunity, which became a source of constant irritation and complaint by the Western Powers, it is within the bounds of truth to say that the declaration for the Open Door in the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 looked as if it were made to violate, and not to observe. With the numerous infractions of the principle by Japan in Manchuria, we shall deal *in extenso* in a later chapter. It is sufficient to say here that, as far as it concerned the maintenance of the Open Door policy in China, the second Anglo-Japanese alliance did nothing more than lip-service to the policy. Like all the sanctimonious agreements that Japan has entered into since 1902, it proved to be absolutely useless and worthless for the maintenance of the Open Door policy.<sup>1</sup> Its efficacy was tested in the five years following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, but it was found wanting.

The hollowness of the profession for the Open Door in China and for her independence and integrity became all the more glaring with the con-



clusion of secret agreements between Japan and Russia, first in 1907, and again in 1910. The secret agreement of 1907 was entered into at the same time as the public agreement of that year. Its principal object was to delimit the respective spheres of interest or influence of Japan and Russia in Manchuria. The secret agreement of 1910 supplemented the public agreement of the same year, which was entered into by Japan and Russia as a direct answer to the challenge which the American Secretary offered in the form of a proposal for the neutralisation of railways in Manchuria. Besides reaffirming their respective spheres in Manchuria, the secret agreement provided for the maintenance of their acquired interests even at the risk of resorting to force.

## IV

### THE THIRD ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

WHILE busily engaged in the gigantic task of empire-building in Korea, and thoroughly occupied in her process of peaceful penetration in Manchuria, Japan was not unmindful of the fact that her alliance with Great Britain, concluded on August 12, 1905, required a careful revision in order to meet the important political changes that had taken place in the Far East in the five or six years following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese conflict.

It should be recalled, in the first place, that the second alliance was signed before Japan and Russia agreed upon the terms of peace as finally embodied in the Portsmouth Treaty. Between the two Powers, technically speaking, the war was still going on, and peace had not yet been concluded. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 was entered into *flagrante bello*. This fact accounted for the presence of the sixth article in the alliance treaty, which provided for the continuous maintenance of neutrality by Great Britain if no other Power should join in hostilities against Japan. With the conclusion of peace at Portsmouth, this provision became no longer useful as it was no longer applicable.

And it must be noted that the defeat of Russia was in itself an important change in the diplomatic situation in the Far East. Instead of being a menace to the British interests in Northern China, in India, and in the Middle East, Russia, through her readiness to forget the past and willingness to reconcile with former foes,—became a fast friend, not only of Japan, but also of Great Britain. The Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907 and 1910 and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 show more than anything else the radical change of heart and policy on the part of Russia. The conclusion in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian agreement settled once forever the outstanding disputes regarding their mutual interests in the Near East and Middle East and removed the traditional Russian menace to India. The second alliance was partly directed against Russia, and the provision for “the security of the Indian frontier” had apparently the Russian menace in view. It is hardly necessary to point out that such a provision, with a friendly Russia in the North, would be meaningless.

But the most radical change in the political situation in the Far East was the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, which, according to the contemporary interpretations given by the press in the Orient, was the direct result of the Russo-Japanese agreement of that year. It should be recalled that in the second alliance treaty, Japan was recognised to have possessed “paramount political, military,

and economic interests in Korea," and the right to take such measures for the guidance, control, and protection of the kingdom. And the measure which Japan deemed proper and necessary for the purpose was annexation. With the Hermit Kingdom becoming an integral part of the Japanese Empire, such a recognition by Great Britain as found in the alliance agreement would be not only unnecessary, but entirely superfluous. It was highly desirable that all these provisions should be eliminated from the agreement, as they were no longer applicable or useful. Thus, on July 13, 1911, a new alliance was concluded at London, the object of which was, like that of the second alliance, to maintain the general peace in Eastern Asia and India, to insure the independence and integrity of China and the Open Door policy, and to preserve the territorial rights of the Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India and their special interests in those regions.

In view, however, of the readiness on the part of Great Britain to accept without protest the secret agreements which Japan, her ally, had entered into with Russia in 1907 and in 1910 and which, as we have pointed out in the previous chapter, were hardly in accord with the Open Door principle but clearly in violation of the integrity of China, it was difficult to understand how these two Powers could thus brazenly pronounce to the world that the maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity in

China and of her integrity was included among the objects of the alliance. Did not the Contracting Parties rely for their bold but meaningless assertion upon the assurance that the Russo-Japanese secret agreement of 1907 and of 1910 would remain forever a secret? Or were they quite aware that the profession for the integrity of China and the Open Door policy was but a meaningless reiteration which was in conflict with their secret engagements and understandings? They were either presuming too much upon the general ignorance of the world or dishonest to themselves. In one case they deliberately entered into an engagement which they knew was impossible of fulfilment, and in the other they undertook to do something for China and for the rest of the world which they never had any honest intention of doing. The alliance might serve to consolidate the general peace in the region of Asia and India and to maintain the territorial rights and special interests of the High Contracting Parties in those regions. To say that it would also serve to preserve "the common interests of all the Powers in China" by insuring her independence and integrity and the principle of equal opportunities is to attribute to the alliance a virtue not intended even by its Contracting Powers.

The real object of the third Anglo-Japanese alliance was, however, to be found in the desire of the British Government to make it clear that the

alliance, if it was to be continued, should not and could not be held to apply in case of an armed conflict between Japan on the one side and the United States on the other. This exception was deemed necessary by the British Government for reasons of State, and the necessity became all the more apparent to the British Government when it found that the relations between Japan and the United States were none too cordial and that Japan, as an answer to the American proposal for the neutralisation of the Manchurian railways, did not hesitate in 1910 to conclude a secret agreement amounting to a defensive alliance with Russia, which had undeniably the United States in view. The British Government had, for this reason, considered a revision of the alliance so as to make it inapplicable in case of difficulties between Japan and the United States. The opportunity did not present itself until at the end of 1910 or at the beginning of 1911, when President Taft urged the conclusion of general Arbitration Treaties with all the Powers of the world. An Arbitration Treaty was being negotiated between Great Britain and the United States, and another one between the United States and Japan. It is needless to say that such general arbitration arrangements would conflict with the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. "Our subsisting alliance with Japan," observed the *London Times* editorially, July 10, 1911, "binds us to come to her assistance in the cases defined, and it remains



in force until 1915. Any such alliance manifestly conflicts with any general arbitration treaty with a third Power. The difficulty would never be likely to arise in practice, for, in spite of the occasional wild talk of Chauvinists, responsible statesmen on both sides of the Pacific are unanimous in regarding as inconceivable any development in which our obligations under the alliance would conflict with those under the proposed Arbitration Treaty. We all know that our Japanese allies are as anxious as we are to live on friendly terms with the United States and to see us on friendly terms with them; and we have no doubt that the successful conclusion of the present negotiations will be sincerely welcomed in Japan. Nevertheless, the formal contradiction between the two treaties is not to be gainsaid. Happily our relations with Japan are such that should it be thought desirable, there would be no difficulty in agreeing upon some modification in the wording of the Treaty of alliance that would do away with the incongruity." And it may be added that the conclusion of a general Arbitration Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, or between the United States and Japan, was something more than mere incongruity. Bound as they were by the alliance subsisting between them, Japan and Great Britain would, naturally and very logically, be confronted with conflicting obligations which they could not fulfil at one and the same time. It was not only desirable, but highly

necessary, therefore, that this possibility of conflicting obligations should be eliminated.

It was with the removal of this embarrassment in view that the Governments of Japan and Great Britain began negotiations for the revision of the alliance. The discussion of the revision could not, of course, be confined to the mere phraseology of the alliance. It was sure to raise the infinitely more important question of its prolongation. At that time, it should be recalled that the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions were assembled in London for Imperial Conference. The British Government seized this precious opportunity to discuss with them the general principles of British foreign policy and to secure from them the unanimous approval of the revision and renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. "The Government laid the general principles of our foreign policy fully and plainly before their colleagues from overseas in the confidential sittings with the Defence Committee," the *London Times* commented in an editorial, July 13, 1911. "There was a free interchange of views upon these high matters, amongst which the Japanese alliance stands prominent, at these sittings; and it is clear that, when the Dominion Ministers had heard the statements and the explanations made to them, they were satisfied that this policy is the best that could be devised in the lasting interests of the Empire as a whole and of each of its constituent units. Any new arrangement

now made with Japan, or any modification of our present arrangement with her, will be made with the new authority and the new moral force given to it by the previous assent of all the self-governing Dominions." And it was with this assent that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Baron T. Kato, Japanese Ambassador at London, signed on July 13, 1911, the third Anglo-Japanese alliance, of which the fourth Article was easily the most important. It provided that should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, the said party would not be obliged to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty was in force.

It has generally been assumed that Great Britain first proposed this revision. The truth is otherwise, however. Viscount Ishii, who came to the United States at the head of a Special Mission in 1917 and who took part in the revision of the alliance in 1911, was responsible for the statement that Japan had taken the initiative in the matter. In a speech before the National Press Club at Washington, September 21, 1917, Viscount Ishii said: "Let me tell you a little piece of secret history. When it became known to us that the American and British Governments were alike desirous of entering into a general treaty of arbitration, but that they found the making of such a treaty was precluded by the terms of the British alliance with

Japan as they then stood, it was not with the consent of Japan, but it was because of Japan's spontaneous offer that the stipulations of the alliance were revised so that no obstacle might be put in the way of the proposed treaty. As you know, Article IV of the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty now in effect excludes the United States from its operation. This is a true account of the genesis of that clause. . . . It was my good fortune to be in the Foreign Office at Tokio at the time of the revision of the Treaty of alliance with Great Britain, and, modest as was the part I took therein, I can give you the personal and emphatic assurance that there was at that time no one in the Government or among the public of Japan opposed to the terms of that revision."

Was it really true that "at that time no one in the Government or among the public of Japan opposed to the terms of that revision?" Of course, officials of the Japanese Government would have very little to say; at least, not publicly. But the Japanese press, muzzled though it was, then as it is now, could not be kept permanently silent. We have here at least one editorial comment on the subject by a Japanese paper, which is interesting, not only for the views it expressed, but also for the fairly accurate prediction which it ventured. The *Yorodzu* regarded the renewed and revised pact as a "diplomatic blunder" of the Japanese Government

(of the Katsura Cabinet) and commented on it in the following language:

“The revised treaty of alliance makes Japan a ludicrous figure. She is required to stand guard to India and British interests in China without receiving any return from England. There is no doubt that the renewal and the revision of the alliance was made at the initiative of Downing Street. Our diplomats have the peculiar virtue of being passive and of following the lead of other nations endowed with greater diplomatic finesse. The alliance is to remain binding for ten years from now. Just wait ten years. Before that period expires, England will have found or created a chance to clasp hands with Germany, while her colonies bordering the Pacific will have augmented their armaments to such an extent that they will no longer be haunted by the spectre of a Japanese invasion. Until such a stage is reached, Great Britain needs Japanese co-operation. But when once that stage is reached, British interests in China will no longer be threatened by Germany, while the British fleet, freed of anxiety over the activities of the Kaiser’s navy, will be able to leave home waters and protect the colonies. Then it is time that John Bull would throw the alliance overboard.”

This prophecy was made ten years ago, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was revised and renewed for the second time. In the light of the events that have taken place since then, it is easy to appreciate how near the prophecy has come to be true. Be-

fore the alliance has expired, Great Britain, instead of finding or creating "a chance to clasp hands with Germany," has, together with the allied Powers, defeated Germany in such a way that she cannot prove to be a menace again. German interests in the Orient have been practically wiped out, and the German fleet has been reduced to a negligible quantity. Thus, within the life term of the alliance, Great Britain has reached the stage when or where she ceases to be haunted by a spectre of a Japanese or German invasion. British interests in the Far East are no longer threatened by Germany, and her colonies in the Pacific, which have always dreaded of a Japanese invasion, have found themselves now greatly relieved, not only by the increase of their own armaments, but also by the fact that the British fleet, freed of the duty to counter the German menace in the North Sea, is able to leave home waters for the protection of the colonies. With this vital change of circumstances, all the reasons which had possibly prompted Great Britain to revise and to renew the alliance in 1911 have disappeared, and it remains to be seen whether or not "John Bull would throw the alliance overboard."

The misgivings which Japanese newspapers had entertained in 1911 about the revised compact, were, however, a little premature. It was then suspected that, as far as the United States was concerned, the alliance was emasculated by the insertion of



Article IV, exempting either contracting party to go to war with a Power with whom there was in existence a treaty of general arbitration. On the contrary, the alliance was not deprived of its efficacy. The treaty of general arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, in anticipation of the conclusion of which the alliance was revised, was not ratified by the Senate. The result is that, since 1911, there has been no agreement or convention in existence between the two countries that can be regarded as within the definition of a treaty of general arbitration. The obligation of Great Britain to come to Japan's assistance has never been affected.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance has now already reached its stipulated term of ten years, and it would have lapsed had it not been for the self-extending clause in the treaty. In the Summer of 1920, the renewal of the alliance was considered by the Governments of Japan and Great Britain. Owing to the desire on the part of the British Government to consult the opinions of the Dominions about the continuation of the alliance, no definite decision was reached. It was officially announced, however, that the alliance was found to be inconsistent with the League of Nations, in letter, if not in spirit. "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan," reads the official communication to the Secretary of the League, which was signed by Lord Curzon and Viscount Chinda, and dated July 8,

1920, "have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese agreement of July 13, 1911, now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments desire earnestly to respect. They accordingly have the honour jointly to inform the League that they recognise the principle that if the said agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant." In other words, the alliance was by mutual agreement between the Japanese and British Governments permitted to run for another year, and if it were continued after July, 1921, they would so revise its terms as to be consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations in letter as well as in spirit.

This joint communication to the Secretary of the League was held by the law officers of the Crown, Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock, as constituting a denunciation of the alliance; and accordingly, if this view had prevailed, the alliance would have ceased to exist, by July 8, 1921—"one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it." But Lord Birkenhead took a different position. On July 3, 1921, when the Dominion Premiers deliberating on the alliance were unable to reach a decision as to its renewal or non-renewal, and when Premier Lloyd George was about to propose that

the operation of the alliance should be extended for a period of three months for the purpose of allowing a full discussion on its disposal, the Lord High Chancellor made the eleventh-hour ruling (though it might seem very timely to some British statesmen) that the joint note sent to the Secretary of the League of Nations, July 8, 1920, did not constitute a "denunciation" and that the alliance would, therefore, automatically remain in force.

In this ruling, both the Governments of Japan and Great Britain acquiesced. Accordingly, on July 7, 1921, another joint communication was despatched to the Secretary of the League of Nations, announcing that the contracting parties of the alliance had agreed that, in case of inconsistency, the procedure prescribed by the League would take the place of the procedure prescribed by the alliance. The communication reads:

"Whereas the Government of Great Britain and Japan informed the League of Nations in their joint notification of 8th July, 1920, that they recognised the principle that if the Anglo-Japanese alliance agreement of 13th July, 1911, is continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with the Covenant of the League, they hereby notify the League, pending further action, that they are agreed that if any situation arises whilst the agreement remains in force in which the procedure prescribed by the terms of the agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League

of Nations, then the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the agreement."

Until it is denounced by both or either of its contracting parties, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as it stands to-day, will remain in force indefinitely.

## V

### THE UNITED STATES AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

A CLOSE study of the history of the development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, such as presented in the preceding chapters, must lead inevitably to the conclusion that the interests of the United States are intimately involved. The very fact that Japan and Great Britain saw fit to attempt to exempt the United States from the operation of the alliance when they were engaged in revising and renewing it in 1911 is an unmistakable recognition by the Contracting Powers of the interests which the United States has had in the alliance. The most cordial sentiments which the Dominion statesmen have publicly expressed for America and their insistence upon American co-operation in settling the Pacific and Far Eastern problems are additional proofs of the fact that, of the disposition of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, to renew or not to renew, the United States is by no means an indifferent spectator. Officially, not a word has been said or heard that would indicate that the United States is opposed to the continuation of the alliance. Much of the opposition has found expression in the American newspapers only.

There can be no doubt, however, as to where the Government of the United States stands on the question. If its views have not been expressed before, it is because they will be expressed at a convenient opportunity when they can count most.

The interests of the United States in the future of the alliance grow out of the possibilities of danger which its renewal will naturally imply, and of the important and vital bearing which it will surely have upon the American-British relations in the future, upon the question of limitation of armament, and upon the American policy in the Pacific and the Far East. For almost twenty years, the alliance has existed; but it was not until after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan began to follow the very same aggressive designs upon Manchuria and Korea for which she had fought Russia, that the people in the United States commenced to ask whether the alliance was not being used for purposes diametrically opposed to those mentioned in its preamble. In 1902, when the alliance was entered into for the first time, the United States welcomed it as a potential force in adjusting the political balance of the Far East. When the alliance was revised and renewed in 1905, the attitude of the American people was cold, but not hostile. A few years later, when Japan, intoxicated by her victorious struggle against Russia, attempted to close the "open door" in Manchuria, the United States began to suspect the use-



fulness of the alliance. This suspicion assumed the form of apprehension in 1907-8, when the American-Japanese relations became greatly strained owing to the San Francisco school children question—so much so that President Roosevelt sent the American battle fleet to the Far East, ostensibly on a practising cruise. Hurriedly, the alliance was revised again in 1911, and according to Viscount Ishii whom we have quoted before, this was done in order to exempt the United States from the operation of the alliance. Now the instrument has reached its stipulated term of ten years; it is due for renewal or denunciation. What Japan has done under the cloak of the alliance within the last ten years is a long story which it is not necessary to go into here. It may be said, however, that with the United States, the alliance has grown less and less in favour, not only because Japan has failed to accomplish what has been expected of her, but also because she has done what is contrary to the professed objects of the alliance.

While the official attitude of the United States has never yet been made known, it is no secret that the sentiment of the American people is uniformly against the continuation of the alliance. Japanese publicists have professed inability to see why the American people should oppose the renewal of the alliance which does not directly concern them, and of which they are not a contracting party. When the situation is carefully surveyed and analysed,

however, it is not so difficult as the Japanese writers have thought to understand why the American people, taken as a whole, overwhelmingly oppose the extension of the alliance, either in its present form or with suitable modifications. Their antagonism rests upon a number of reasons, the most important of which are: (1) the belief that the alliance has served its original purpose and is no longer in harmony with the new international order of affairs; (2) the suspicion which they have towards Japan as a nation; (3) the fear of future difficulties between Japan and the United States over the immigration question; (4) the possibility of using the alliance as it has been used in the past as a shield behind which to hide designs upon China contrary to the Open Door principle; (5) the fear that a renewal of the alliance will result in competition in armament between the United States on the one hand, and Japan and Great Britain on the other, and thus menace the British-American relationship, and (6) finally, the belief, amounting almost to conviction, that the alliance will be directed against the United States, protestations by statesmen of Japan and Great Britain to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is admitted on all hands that the alliance has outlived its usefulness, and that with the present day world conditions brought about as a result of the European War, it is no longer in harmony. Russia, who was the objective of the first two al-

liances, has been paralysed by her internal disturbances, and yet for another score of years she is not likely to resume her old vigour and to take a commanding place in the council of nations. In fact, because of the understandings reached between Russia on the one side and Japan and Great Britain on the other, the so-called Russian menace has since 1907 ceased to be the *raison d'être* of the alliance. When it was revised and extended in 1911, it had Germany, instead of Russia, as its potential enemy. The withdrawal of the British squadron from the Far Eastern waters, made necessary by the concentration of British naval forces in the North Sea, is an indication at once of the limited use which Great Britain had made of the alliance, and of the potential enemy against whom it was supposed to operate. Japan's participation in the European War in 1914 to fulfil her obligations to Great Britain as an ally is another proof of the fact that the alliance was directed against Germany. The result of the European conflict is such that to-day Germany has ceased to be a factor of international politics in the Far East. Her erstwhile strong navy has been destroyed; her colonial possessions have been all taken away from her; in short, Germany to-day is bereft of all the possibilities to become a danger either to Great Britain in Europe or to Japan in the Far East. Where is, therefore, the *raison d'être* of the alliance to-day? Obviously, the instrument has served its purpose, and in the

present day international situation its continuance is no longer necessary.

Ever since 1905 when she won the victorious war against Russia, Japan has been suspected by the American people, as by the rest of the world, of harbouring imperialistic ambitions and sinister designs in the Far East and in the Pacific. This suspicion has been greatly strengthened, first by her annexation of Korea; then by her repeated attempts to close the Open Door in Manchuria, by her forcible occupation of Chinese territory and seizure of German possessions in the Pacific, then by her excessive demands upon China, and finally by her forcible appropriation of the northern half of Saghalien and the eastern coast of Siberia. The Yap dispute between Japan and the United States has further contributed to the feeling of distrust which the American people have always had towards the Japanese as a nation. It has been generally believed here in the United States that the alliance has been employed by Japan for the purpose of territorial aggrandisement, and that if it were renewed, it would merely add momentum to her expansion movement which requires immediate checking as it is.

And then it must not be forgotten that, between Japan and the United States, there is always this question of immigration which has not yet been settled and which is not likely to be settled yet for a long time. The United States will continue to

prohibit Japanese immigration, the Western States will continue to legislate against the Japanese already in this country, and Japan will continue to harp on the theme of "race equality." Serious difficulties may easily arise over this question between Japan and United States. With the Anglo-Japanese alliance renewed, it is easy to see the possibility of its being made use of in such difficulties. Even Premier Hughes of Australia, who advocates the extension of the alliance in a modified form, sees the possibility of the Commonwealth being overrun by the Japanese under the ægis of the alliance, and therefore insists upon the policy of "white Australia" as a necessary condition for the continuation of the alliance. Premier Massey of New Zealand, who supports Premier Hughes in his advocacy for the renewal of the alliance, supports him also for the exclusion of the Japanese. Is it any wonder that, while the Dominion statesmen who are in favour of the alliance see trouble ahead, the American people who are opposed to it should also take into serious consideration possible difficulties between Japan and United States over the immigration question? \*

\* A writer in *Current History*, August, 1921, on the Menace of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, makes the point that Japan's policy in regard to the so-called "California issue" is a mere cloak to cover her ambitious designs in the Far East. "This issue, like that of race equality in general, is being used by Japan merely as a smoke screen to hide her actions in the Far East, and to imbue the populace of Japan with a strong hatred of America as a popular pretext for war. Her loud protestations about the California issue are answered by



There is another angle from which the question of the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been viewed in the United States. It has been held that within the last ten or more years Japan has used the alliance as a cloak to cover her sinister designs in China, which are contrary to the Open Door policy and to the principle of equal opportunity for industrial and economic undertakings for all nations in the world. Instances are not wanting to show that the alliance, in spite of its avowed object of preserving "the common interests of all the Powers," has been relied upon to extend or to protect exclusive Japanese interests in China. We need only refer to two well-known cases in which American interests were involved. The first is the so-called Chinchow-Aigun Railway dispute. On October 2, 1909, a preliminary contract was entered into by the Viceroy of Manchuria and the Governor of Fengtien on the one side, and the American Banking Group\* and Pauling & Company (British) on the other, for the financing, construction, and operation of a railway from Chin-

merely pointing to the fact that Japan herself does not allow foreigners to become citizens or hold land, does not allow them even to become labourers or engage in any business. Many Americans now realise that Japan is harping on the California issue to keep America's attention from the Far East, just as she harped on the issue of race equality at the Peace Conference to keep the world's attention from the issue of Shantung."

\* J. P. Morgan & Company, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, the First National Bank, and the National City Bank of New York, constituted the American Group.



chow to Aigun. Secretary Knox, in a memorandum to the British Government, said: "The Government of the United States is prepared cordially to co-operate with His Britannic Majesty's Government in diplomatically supporting and facilitating this enterprise, so important alike to the progress and to the commercial development of China." This enthusiastic overture by the American Secretary of State elicited but a qualified acquiescence in the scheme from the British Government. In the meantime, Japan objected to the construction of the line. Russia, who was always hand in glove with her former enemy, also protested to the Chinese Government against the scheme. "British policy at this juncture," said an English writer on Far Eastern questions, "might have served the purposes of the 'open door' and international morality; but Downing Street's loyalty to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, wherein lay clearly the line of least resistance, took the form of a general acquiescence in Japan's proceedings, even though these were obviously detrimental to the fundamental objects for which the alliance was made." As a result, the scheme of financing and constructing the Chinchow-Aigun Railway collapsed like a bubble.

Closely connected with this affair was the well-known proposal by Secretary Knox for the commercial neutralisation of Manchurian railways—a proposal which was cordially welcomed by China as a means of putting an end to the economic in-

roads in Manchuria, was accepted in principle by France and Great Britain, but was flatly rejected by Japan and Russia. Two suggestions were made by the United States, either of which, if carried out, would have safeguarded China's sovereignty over Manchuria and maintained the Open Door therein. "The most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to promote the development of those provinces under a practical application of the policy of the Open Door and equal commercial opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways, the railroads, under an economic, scientific, and impartial administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds furnished for that purpose by the interested Powers willing to participate." "Should this suggestion not be found feasible in its entirety, then the desired end would be approximated, if not attained, by Great Britain and the United States diplomatically supporting the Chinchow-Aigun arrangement and inviting the interested Powers friendly to complete commercial neutralisation of Manchuria to participate in the financing and construction of that line and of such additional lines as future commercial development may demand, and at the same time to supply funds for the purchase by China of such of the existing lines as might be offered for inclusion in this system." The Chinchow-Aigun project, as we have shown, did not materialise owing to objections from Japan and

Russia, in which Great Britain, because of her allied relationship with Japan, acquiesced. The proposal for neutralisation, however, met with no better fate. Japan and Russia joined hands once again, and objected to the proposal on the ground that if it were carried out it would alter the *status quo* in Manchuria. Like the Chinchow-Aigun project, therefore, the neutralisation proposal vanished into thin air. This failure, it is true, could not be attributed directly to the existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. On the other hand, it is equally true that, had it not been for the alliance, Great Britain would have been free to take a stand against the Russo-Japanese combination. In other words, because of her political partnership with the Island Empire of the Far East, Great Britain was tied hard and fast to the wheels of Japanese diplomacy in China. The alliance, with the ostensible object of preserving common interests of all nations in China, was, at least in these two instances, nothing short of an unsurpassable barrier to the enjoyment by the United States and other Powers of equal opportunity in Manchuria.

Now, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the United States will not yield an inch in her insistence upon the Open Door policy, and will not barter away her rights to equal opportunity in China (Manchuria included) for any political combination which the other Powers may enter into in the furtherance of their own interests to the exclusion of those of the rest of the world. It has been

proved beyond doubt that the alliance between Japan and Great Britain has been employed as an instrument in furthering Japanese imperialistic designs in China. To renew it now will be tantamount to sanctioning the sinister way in which it has been made use of.

But the more important reason for objecting to the continuance of the alliance even in a modified form is to be found in the general apprehension that a renewal of the alliance, no matter whatever form it may take and whatever terms it may contain, will eventually result in competition in armament between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Great Britain on the other. This competition, as surely as the sun rises in the East, will give birth to serious misunderstandings, which may result in hostilities, not only between Japan and the United States, but also between the United States and England and her Dominions. One of the arguments that the Prime Minister of Canada has used against the renewal of the alliance is that it would impede the possibilities of an international agreement for the limitation of armaments. And it may be added here, any agreement for limitation of armament must depend largely upon the readiness of the United States. The United States will not be ready to limit her armament, until or unless she can reach a comprehensive understanding with England, with her Dominions. Is it at all likely that such an understanding can be arrived at while

Great Britain is in alliance with Japan who is insisting upon the completion of her eight-eight programme \* and rapidly building up her armament to equal that of the United States? It should always be borne in mind that the question of the renewal

\* Under the title "Japan's Amazing Naval Programme," the *New York Journal of Commerce* made a remarkable analysis of Japan's naval preparations after the conclusion of the European war, by comparing Japan's navy of to-day to that of Germany before the war. It may be pointed out here that Japanese navy personnel is now 76,000 men, exceeding the total of German navy in 1915. The article in question reads:

"The position of the Japanese Government in regard to disarmament is somewhat equivocal. But there is nothing equivocal about the apparent desire of Japan to possess the strongest navy in the world. The policy prompted by such a desire seems to external observation to be as ruinous as it is uncalled for, and one of the good results of such a conference as that for which Senator Borah's resolution provides would be to elicit an intelligible explanation from Japan as to the purpose of the tremendous naval programme to which she stands committed.

"Taking into account the national resources of Japan, the so-called eight-eight naval expansion scheme is the most ambitious ever undertaken in time of peace by any modern nation. It imposes on the Japanese people an effort greater than that of Germany in 1914 when her war preparations reached their maximum. In fighting power it aims at placing Japan nearer the United States than Germany was to England in 1914. It proposes to make Japan the equal if not the superior of America in naval power and will relegate the British navy as it stands to-day definitely to the third place.

"The eight-eight programme provides that Japan must have eight superdreadnoughts and eight battle-cruisers, all less than eight years old. It was at first assumed that this programme included at least four of the superdreadnoughts in the present Japanese navy and four of the present battle-cruiser fleet. But, as a matter of fact, these ships are relegated to the second line, although to-day there are no finer fighting ships afloat.

"The four superdreadnoughts shortly to receive a subordinate rating are larger than any in the British navy, the four battle-cruisers are the equal of the British *Tiger* and larger than the *Repulse* and *Renown*. The first two of the eight



of the alliance is closely and intimately connected with the question of the limitation of armament. After all, the alliance is a military instrument, designed for military purpose. Its continuance, in whatever form it may take, will necessarily mean the continuous military and naval co-operation between Japan and Great Britain. The United States is not building her navy to out-rank that of Great Britain; she is not building her fleet to double that of Japan; the motive that underlies her naval programme can be easily understood: that so long as

new battle-cruisers have just been started, their keels having been laid in December. They are designed to be the equal of the British *Hood* and the American battle-cruisers of the *Lexington* class, 43,000 to 45,000 tons in displacement, carrying 16-inch and possibly 18-inch guns and having a speed of  $33\frac{1}{2}$  knots.

"The world is asked to believe by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Ambassador in London that all this prodigious naval preparation is to defend the coast and the commerce of Japan, and nothing more. But there ought to be some correspondence between the volume of a nation's ocean-borne commerce or the tonnage of the ships that carry it and the relative strength of her fighting fleet.

"Now Japan's merchant marine is approximately only one-fifth that of the United Kingdom and one-fourth that of the United States. Further, Japan's foreign trade is to that of the United Kingdom as 1 to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  and to that of the United States as 1 to  $6\frac{1}{4}$ . Yet Japan is planning to build a navy equal to that of the United States to protect one-four as much merchant shipping and less than one-sixth as much foreign commerce, and proposes greatly to surpass the British navy to protect one-sixth as much merchant shipping and a little over one-fourth as much foreign trade.

"Perhaps the most amazing feature of it all is the docility with which the Japanese taxpayer submits to the crushing burden that is being laid upon him. The naval programme of Japan proposes to use 33.3 per cent. of her entire national revenue for the navy; it claims five times as large a share of her imperial revenues as did the German fleet from the German Imperial Treasury in the last year of peace."



Japan and Great Britain are in alliance, so long will the United States need a navy capable of protecting her own interests in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific. Japan is, as has been shown, sticking to her eight-eight programme. Against whom, the Americans will ask, is she building? Japanese statesmen and diplomats have urged the renewal of the alliance. Why is it necessary to renew the alliance? again the Americans will ask. And against whom is it to be aimed? Whatever may be said about the absolute necessity of carrying out Japan's eight-eight programme for her national defence, and whatever advantages may be pointed out about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese compact, the truth is that, when renewed, and even revised, the alliance will be a serious obstacle to cordial co-operation and good relationship between Great Britain and the United States. This is because the alliance is, in the first place, a military instrument, and as such it is conducive to bringing about armed conflict between Japan and the United States; and secondly, because of this possibility, both countries will be engaged in increasing their armaments; and thirdly, because in case of the outbreak of hostilities, England, if not Great Britain, including Canada, Australia, and other Dominions, would be bound by the alliance to come to the aid of Japan against the United States. Any trifling difficulty, any misunderstanding about Japanese immigration in California or about American interests in China,

will create a *casus belli* more reasonable and perhaps more convincing for resorting to force than the violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. The outbreak of the European War in August, 1914, saw the United States almost as unprepared to face the situation as was China, and for almost two years after the war was raging in Europe, the United States, when called upon to participate in the conflict, was still ill prepared to meet the consequences. She is not to be caught napping again, however. The lesson once learned is not likely to be forgotten again.

Its enthusiastic advocates will point out, then, that the alliance is not, and has never been, directed against the United States. Its renewal will not, therefore, adversely affect the future British-American relations. On the contrary, the United States is intentionally exempted from the operation of the alliance, they will say, pointing to the fourth article of the 1911 agreement as their proof, which reads: "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this alliance shall entail upon such contracting party the obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such a treaty of arbitration is in force." The United States, they say, had concluded in 1911 a treaty of general arbitration with Great Britain, and for that reason, Great Britain will not come to the aid of Japan against the United States in case of war. In

support of this argument, Japanese statesmen at home and diplomats abroad freely gave out statements, purporting to show that Japan and Great Britain, in concluding the alliance, had never had the United States in mind, and that the article quoted above specifically exempted the United States from the operation of the alliance. Thus, Viscount Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador at London, commenting on Lord Northcliffe's assertion that by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese compact Great Britain was not under any obligation to join her ally if war should unfortunately break out between Japan and the United States, issued the following statement to the *London Times*, January 3, 1921:

"I welcome the statement as a timely and wise warning to both Japan and the United States. The basic idea of the alliance is to protect by common action the territorial rights and special interests of both Japan and Great Britain in Eastern Asia and India.

"The United States has never been thought of by the contracting parties as a country which would ever take or contemplate taking any action likely to threaten their territorial rights or special interests in the Far East, and there was, therefore, never in the mind of the Japanese Government any idea to fight the United States at all.

"Moreover, in the most improbable of eventualities, such as a war, I prefer merely for the sake of argument, Japan would not expect England to come to her help since the Japanese and British Governments

agreed to insert in the alliance treaty Article 4, which would absolve Great Britain from any obligation to join Japan against America. Only general phraseology was selected in the alliance agreement for reasons of diplomatic nicety, but what the negotiators of the agreement had in mind is obvious.

"I must, further, state, in refutation of irresponsible and sensational utterances in the American press and elsewhere, that there exists no secret agreement between the Japanese and British Empires. I am sincerely sorry that there are such mischief-makers whose efforts are not only injurious to Japan and England alone but to the United States itself in these circumstances.

"I can assure you with all the emphasis at my command that an alliance will never stand in the way of good understanding and friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, nor is it in the least the intention of Japan to use the alliance as a means to direct pressure in any degree upon her old friend, the United States."

Leaving its accuracy to be commented on a little later, we may at once notice that the statement undertook to "refute" "irresponsible and sensational utterances in the American press and elsewhere," and denied the existence of secret agreement between Japan and Great Britain. This is interesting for the reason that the statement issued on July 4, 1921, by Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador at Washington, was also in the nature of a "refutation" of irresponsible utterances against

the alliance. Of the two, the statement by Baron Shidehara is more interesting and more important, as it had apparently been submitted to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokio before it was given to the press in Washington. It reads:

"Negotiations looking to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance have not yet begun. In the meantime, a campaign seems to be actively at work misrepresenting the possible effect of the alliance upon the United States. By no stretch of the imagination can it be honestly stated that the alliance was ever designed or remotely intended as an instrument of hostility or even defense against the United States.\*

"The Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its history for nearly twenty years, has twice been renewed. In each case the fundamental policy underlying it has remained unchanged. It aims permanently to preserve and to consolidate the general peace of the Far East. The original agreement of 1902, in line with that policy, was calculated to localize any war which might be forced upon either contracting party in defense of its defined interests or vital security. It was made when China was under the menace of foreign aggression, and the United States, showing the utmost friendliness toward both parties to the alliance, viewed the compact with sympathy and approval.

\* The version given out by the Foreign Office at Tokio is somewhat different in wording. The first paragraph reads: "A commencement has not yet been made with negotiations in respect of the continuation of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan. Yet the work of propaganda appears already to have been set on foot with the object of misrepresenting the effect which the alliance is likely to produce upon the United States," etc.

"In 1905, when the alliance was renewed and revised to meet the changed conditions that followed the Russo-Japanese War, no thought occurred to the statesmen of either country that the United States might possibly become a potential enemy of either, and for that reason, and that alone, no provision was inserted taking so remote a contingency into consideration.

"The alliance was again revised in 1911, and Article IV of that agreement contains the following provision:

Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

"This provision, in its relation to the United States, has often been made the subject of conflicting interpretations. To a practical mind, however, the circumstances which led up to its inclusion should at once serve to remove all doubt regarding its significance. The idea of revising the alliance in 1911 was conceived primarily with the object of facilitating the negotiations which were known to be then in progress between London and Washington for the conclusion of a general arbitration treaty.

"Neither Japan nor Great Britain has ever contemplated, under the alliance, any *casus foederis* prejudicial or inimical to the interest of the United States; and any plan designed to remove the possibility of an armed conflict between the United States and Great Britain was of course agreeable to Japan. It was in pursuance of this policy that the quoted provision of Article IV was adopted.



"The same policy inspires Japan as strongly to-day as ever before. It has not, in any degree, been affected by the fact that the Anglo-American general arbitration treaty failed to secure the approval of the United States Senate. Nor is it practically necessary to carry on the legal analysis of the question as to whether the Peace Commission treaty, signed and ratified by the United States and Great Britain in 1914, should be construed as a general arbitration treaty within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. For, apart from that question, it was already well understood at the time of negotiating the existing agreement that the alliance should in no case be directed against the United States.

"In explanation of Japan's attitude, Count Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, made the following statement to the Budget Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives on February 4, 1921:

As far as I understand, when Article IV of the treaty (Anglo-Japanese alliance) was inserted, the United States was specifically in mind, and therefore, as a practical matter, the question whether the general arbitration treaty mentioned in Article IV has been ratified by the United States Senate or not makes no particular difference. In other words, looking at the matter from a broad point of view, we can safely say that already at the time of the conclusion of the treaty (Anglo-Japanese alliance) it was understood that there should be no application of this treaty to the United States.

"Japan is naturally anxious to strengthen the ties

of friendship and loyal co-operation between herself and the British Empire, which she regards as of the utmost importance to the stability of the Far East. At the same time, it is the firm and fixed determination of Japan to permit nothing to hamper her traditional relations of good will and good understanding with the United States. She is satisfied that these two affiliations are in no way incompatible, but, on the contrary, complementary and even essential to each other.

"Charges have sometimes been made that the alliance tends to encourage aggressive designs on the part of Japan in China. If this were the case it would be contrary to the preamble of the agreement, which provides for

the preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

"Japan fully realizes that any such venture of aggression would be not only hopeless of attainment, but destructive of her own security and welfare. She sincerely wishes for China an early achievement of peace, unity and stable government. She desires to cultivate her relations with that country along the path of mutual respect and helpfulness. Her vast commercial interests alone, if for no other consideration, point unmistakably to the wisdom of such a policy.

"This is a basic principle of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In no adverse direction has the alliance ever exerted its influence."

An ambassadorial statement such as this, given

out for publication presumably with the authority of or under instructions from the Tokio Government, is unusual, if not unprecedented. In spite of its tone of marked friendliness for the United States, and in spite of its obvious intention of assuring the United States that the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, then under consideration in London, was in no way hostile to this country, the statement had nevertheless the effect quite different from that which was looked for. The first general impression that one gets from a perusal of the statement is that Japan is eager for the renewal of the alliance and is determined to do everything in her power to remove, or to counteract, all antagonistic influences in the United States which might have an effect upon the minds of British statesmen. The intimation that propagandists were at work in the United States, misrepresenting the possible effect of the renewal of the alliance, raises the question whether the ambassadorial statement, designed as it was as an explanation or as an answer to the "campaign" of misrepresentation, was itself in the nature of propaganda. It is an admitted fact that about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance very little has been said or written in the United States—much less than either in Japan or Great Britain. To regard as a "campaign" "misrepresenting the possible effect of the alliance upon the United States," or to regard as "a work of propaganda," as the Tokio

version has it, a few occasional and scattered comments in the American newspapers more or less unfavourable to the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, is certainly inaccurate, if it is not in itself a case of "misrepresentation." And finally, the question persists in the mind of the readers: why should the Anglo-Japanese alliance be renewed at all? Or, as an offensive and defensive instrument, where is the necessity for renewing it? In a two-column editorial, under the caption "A Useless Alliance," the *New York Times*, July 5, 1921, made the most pertinent remark apropos of the statement made by the Japanese Embassy and of the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It deserves to be quoted in full:

"Remarkable in every way is the statement about the Anglo-Japanese alliance given out for publication yesterday by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. Baron Shidehara must, of course, have been speaking with the authority of his own Government, and if he followed diplomatic precedent must have ascertained that his public declaration would not be displeasing to our State Department. In its tone of marked friendliness for the United States it could be displeasing to no American. It is gratifying to have this official assertion of the 'firm and fixed determination of Japan' to allow nothing to impair a good understanding with this country; and the Ambassador's assertion that by no stretch of the imagination could the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty be interpreted as having an intent in any way hostile to the United

States is entirely in line with the positive statements which the British Government has more than once recently made.

“Making full acknowledgment of these protestations of friendship, Americans must still ask for sound reason why the alliance between Japan and Great Britain should be continued, even in modified form. Both parties to it affirm that it has no possible bearing on their relations with the United States. Yet it is evident that they cannot talk about it at all without bringing in the United States. This is just as true of British Ministers as it is of the Japanese Government. The very first question which the Premiers of the Dominions raised when they got to London—in fact, even before they got there—was why any step should be taken that might even seem to involve embarrassment for America. The curious result is that in all the public utterances, whether of British or Japanese officials, a note almost of apology is apparent. It is not absent from the explanations given by Baron Shidehara. Indeed, his amiable and considerate words seem as if intended to lead up to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is no longer needed. If in truth it is not aimed at the United States or any other great Power, why renew it at all?

“This query is plainly one which is troubling England. A surprising amount of English sentiment is manifesting itself against the extension of the alliance. This has been taken note of by the spokesmen for the Government. Both Mr. Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Lloyd George have been as explicit as possible in declaring that it is ‘a cardinal feature of British policy’



to cultivate the best relations with the United States. Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, stated flatly that 'we should be no party to any alliance directed against America or in which we could be called upon to act against America.' This is welcome, but still leaves us in the dark concerning the motives for the renewed alliance between Great Britain and Japan.

"On this subject Mr. Chamberlain was particularly obscure. He virtually admitted that the conditions which had given rise originally to the Anglo-Japanese alliance had 'passed away.' But, he continued, 'what about the conditions of to-morrow?' The British Government had to look forward 'into the possible combinations of the future.' All this, it is clear, leaves us just where we were. And when Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech to the Premiers, undertook to show why the Japanese alliance should be renewed, he did not emerge from an unsatisfactory and even mysterious vagueness. He spoke of England's gratitude to Japan for help given in the war. It was a 'well-trying friendship,' which it was hoped would be preserved. Very good, but with what special object? Something is said about the solution of all problems in the Far East. But no one can talk of them without at once acknowledging that the interest of the United States in them is as important as that of any other country. In fact, both Lloyd George and Mr. Chamberlain, as well as Baron Shidehara, conceded that such is the case. So convinced of this is General Smuts that he has proposed a special conference of the Pacific Powers to deal with the whole problem of the Orient before the Anglo-Japanese alliance is extended. Yet if such a confer-



ence were to succeed, even measurably, it would cause the Anglo-Japanese treaty to appear more than ever useless.

"The whole matter is evidently one giving no small concern to the British Government. It is not content with the offhand opinion of the Lord Chancellor that the failure to denounce the treaty with Japan would have the effect automatically of continuing it for at least one or two years. The dispatches state that Mr. Lloyd George intends to go behind Lord Birkenhead and consult the law officers of the Crown. He evidently is aware of the uneasiness of the Dominion Premiers and also of the drift of English public opinion adverse to the treaty, at least in its present form.

"While the United States stands apart at present from the negotiation, our interest in it is obvious. We cannot fail to be concerned at the possibilities involved in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Stronger guarantees than now exist that it could never be used against this country are certainly desirable, if it is to be kept in force. All that we have to depend upon now is the rather roundabout and inconclusive legal argument based upon Article IV of the treaty as it was revised in 1911. Something more definite and binding should be written into it if it is to be renewed. This the British Dominions would desire as strongly as the United States.

"Even so, the question would recur why there should any longer be such an alliance at all. If it was at first designed as a safeguard against German ambitions in the Far East, any danger from that source is to-day chimerical. The possibilities of Russian aggression in

the Orient are no longer what they were conceived to be in 1905. The occasion of the treaty has passed, and with it the treaty itself ought to pass. All its professed objects, so far as they are legitimate, can better be secured by a more comprehensive agreement. The Anglo-Japanese alliance is on its face exclusive. What the civilized nations desire is an understanding that is universal. The original alliance, even if changed in detail, would be continually open to suspicion. Why not drop it in order to give place to an all-embracing agreement into which every nation that desired could enter with good-will and entire confidence?"

Now it remains but to add that it is inaccurate and highly misleading to say that, by virtue of the provision on general arbitration found in Article IV of the 1911 agreement, the United States is exempted from the operation of the alliance. At the time of the revision of the alliance, there was under negotiation between Great Britain and the United States a treaty of general arbitration. In fact, according to Viscount Ishii whom we have quoted in a previous chapter, and Baron Shidehara, whose statement we have reproduced in the above, the alliance was revised in 1911 with the object of facilitating the negotiations between London and Washington for the conclusion of a general arbitration treaty. Article IV was, therefore, inserted in the alliance in anticipation of successful conclusion of such a treaty between Great Britain and United States. Unfortunately, the Senate refused

to ratify the treaty when concluded, on the ground that it impinged on the sovereignty of the United States. The result is that no "treaty of general arbitration" exists to-day between the two countries. The only treaty now in existence that approximates the nature of a general arbitration treaty, is the Peace Commission Treaty, signed on September 15, 1914. It provides for the investigation of all disputes before resorting to war by a commission which will be given one year in which to report. It provides for delay, but not for arbitration. It contains no stipulation that would prevent resorting to war, after an investigation has been made. Strictly speaking, it is not a "treaty of general arbitration," and can never be considered as such. Baron Shidehara, while admitting in his statement the fact that the Anglo-American treaty of general arbitration failed to secure the approval of the Senate, refused to say that the Peace Commission treaty "should be construed as a general arbitration treaty within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese agreement." It is evident, therefore, that Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is inoperative, so long as the specified kind of treaty does not exist. The United States is not exempted from the operation of the alliance, and Great Britain is morally and legally bound to come to Japan's aid in case of war against the United States. It is no wonder that, among the American people, the belief is very strong,

amounting almost to conviction, that the alliance, if renewed, will be directed against the United States, protestations by statesmen and diplomats of Japan to the contrary notwithstanding. Both Russia and Germany, against whom the alliance was originally directed, have disappeared as world Powers, and for years to come they will remain impotent. Against whom will the alliance be directed then, if not against the United States?

Very recently, it has transpired that, as soon as the Peace Commission Treaty was concluded and ratified by Great Britain and the United States in 1914, the British Government notified the Government at Tokio that the said treaty was to be considered as a "treaty of general arbitration" within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This report finds circulation only in newspapers. There is no official or "authoritative" statement either denying or affirming it. It is not known that the United States has been informed that the Peace Commission Treaty with Great Britain has been considered as an arbitration treaty within the meaning of Article IV of the alliance.\*

The Washington correspondent of the London

\* It is held in some quarters that the Root-Bryce arbitration treaty of 1908 is within the meaning of the stipulation of the alliance. Those who have held this view have apparently overlooked the last article of the said treaty, which provides: "The present Convention is concluded for a period of five years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications." The ratifications were exchanged at Washington, June 4, 1908.

*Times* stated the situation quite accurately when he said that the continuance of Great Britain's and Japan's association in alliance was an insuperable obstacle to Britain and America being in accord. "I am able to say with absolute certainty," he said, "that all efforts have been unavailing to get inserted into the new treaty of alliance a clause exempting the United States from the implications of the treaty. To conceal this fact will serve no good purpose, because the continuance of Britain's and Japan's association in alliance, however it may be modified, is an insuperable obstacle to Britain and America being in accord. America's policy of close and friendly co-operation presupposes that Britain will be free from such commitments as the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance will prevent any agreement regarding the limitations of armaments, and will complicate—perhaps rendering impossible—the solution of the Pacific problem. America realises that Japan wants renewal and that Britain is reluctant to refuse a loyal ally's desire, and that she does not wish to adopt a policy taking race into account if a road can be found out of it." The road is found in the Conference on the limitation of armaments and on the Pacific problems, which, if successful, will surely bring about a solution of the involved problems of armament and the Far East on a plane above that of engagements like the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

## VI

### CHINA AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

**A**SIDE from Japan and Great Britain, its contracting parties, there is no country whose interests and rights are so directly and so intimately affected by the alliance as those of China. Ever since 1902 when the alliance was entered into for the first time, China has been made its virtual victim in more sense than one. Her interests have been adversely affected; her sovereign rights have been frequently encroached upon; her territory has been twice made the theatre of war; her economic development has been seriously impeded; her political growth has been unnecessarily retarded; her territory has been disposed of by the very Powers who have professed to maintain her integrity; her internal peace has been repeatedly disturbed, though somewhat indirectly, by her neighbour who undertakes to preserve peace in the Far East; and her Open Door policy has been reduced to a mere fiction by the very Power who seeks to preserve "the common interests of all the Powers in China." In short, within the last score of years, the lifetime of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, China has been its unwilling victim. She has been the loser, not the



gainer. Is it any wonder that she now strongly objects to its renewal? If there is one country which has every reason to object to the continuation of the alliance, it is China.

That the interests of China are intimately involved in the disposition of the alliance, as much as are those of its contracting parties, is apparent to any one who has watched the evolution of the combination from its very beginning. In 1902, when the alliance was concluded for the first time, the territory in which it was supposed to operate was practically limited to China and Korea. For the second alliance, concluded in 1905, the sphere of operation was extended to India. In 1910 Korea was made an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The scope of the third alliance was, therefore, again limited to China and India. The exact language used in the alliance describing the regions in which it was supposed to operate is "the regions of Eastern Asia and India." But what is India but a colonial possession of Great Britain? What is Eastern Asia but another geographical expression for China? If Great Britain desires to have her imperial interests and territorial rights in India safeguarded, it is well and good, and there shall be no one to question her right in doing so, except, perhaps, the Indian people who may have a better opinion of themselves and who may not be able to see the necessity of calling upon Japan to defend them. And if Japan desires to have her imperial

interests and territorial rights in Korea defended, it is within her right to do so, and no one will question it except the Koreans who naturally consider the Japanese as interlopers in their country. Both Japan and Great Britain, however, begin to encroach upon the rights of China as an independent and sovereign nation, when they arrogate to themselves the well-intentioned but none the less unnecessary task of maintaining and consolidating the general peace in "Eastern Asia" which is, when Korea and India are counted out, to all intents and purposes, but another geographical expression for China.

That the alliance as it stands to-day has its main interests in China is shown by the language used in its preamble. One of its avowed objects is said to be "the preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations." Why the two Contracting Powers alone have undertaken the task which, in its very nature, ought to fall upon the shoulders of all the Powers interested in equal opportunities in China and in her territorial integrity, is a question to which there has been yet no answer. The same question may be asked about "the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India" which is obviously a task for all, and not for individual,

nations interested in these regions. "The preservation of peace in the Far East," His Excellency Sao-ke Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister to the United States, pointed out at the banquet of the New York State Bankers' Association, Atlantic City, June 24, 1921, "is a matter of such supreme moment that it concerns not only England and Japan, but other countries as well. China and the United States ought to have something to say in the matter." But has the alliance ever succeeded in maintaining peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India? Has it ever carried out its professed object of preserving "the common interests of all the Powers in China?" Has it approached anywhere near its avowed purpose of "insuring the independence and integrity" of China? And finally how far has it been successful, or has it been successful at all, in maintaining "the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China"? Minister Sze, in his address referred to above, defined the Anglo-Japanese alliance as "a warlike measure designed by England and Japan to protect their interests in the Far East." As a measure for war, it cannot succeed in maintaining peace; and as an instrument designed to protect special interests of particular Powers, it can never succeed in preserving the common interests of all nations. The alliance may have been useful in the defence and maintenance of the special interests and territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the

regions of Eastern Asia and India, but it has proved worse than useless as far as its other avowed objects are concerned. It is worse than useless, for it not only has failed to accomplish those objects, but also has violated the fundamental principles in which the alliance is said to have been conceived.

Without generalising too much, let us come to the specific reasons why the Anglo-Japanese alliance, its high-sounding and lofty pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, has proved to be a compact damaging to China and her sovereign interests. It is well-known that China strongly objects to the renewal of the alliance. The reasons for her objection are many, of which the more significant ones are (1) the mention of China in the agreement without her knowledge or assent; (2) the violation of her territorial integrity under the ægis of the alliance; (3) the incompatibility of the alliance with the League of Nations, of which China, and Japan and Great Britain as well are members; (4) the impediment which the alliance places in the economic development of China; (5) the fear that its continuance would mean the continuance of Japan's dominance and domination in China; and (6) finally the failure to maintain peace in the Far East owing to the existence of the alliance.

It is needless to say that the failure of Japan and Great Britain to consult China in the negotiation of the alliance is a just cause of complaint, espe-

cially when her vital interests are involved in it. "You observe that this alliance has a great deal to do with China," said the Chinese Minister at Washington in a speech we have already referred to in the above, "but China has nothing to do with it. Here is an agreement vitally affecting China, but China has not even been consulted in its making. You will agree with me that any nation would resent such treatment." As early as March, 1920, when the subject of the renewal or termination of the alliance began to occupy the press in the Far East, China made representations to the British Government, pointing out that, while the conclusion of the alliance was primarily a matter between its Contracting Parties, the mention of China in the agreement justified her demand to be consulted. In other words, uninformed and unconsulted in its making, China has been made a subject of international agreement by Japan and Great Britain, not once, but again and again. She has been treated merely "as a territorial entity." Matters affecting her international standing and international relations have been disposed of behind her back and without her assent. This treatment is not only humiliating to China, but also unbecoming to the Contracting Powers themselves. It is, therefore, quite proper for China to demand that either she should be consulted in the renewal of the alliance or no mention of her should be made in agreement. To this representation, the British Government



merely replied that "the question of the renewal or the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not yet come up for consideration," and that "inasmuch as the successive agreements had been couched in the same language, it would naturally follow that if the alliance were renewed it must follow the same lines." \* In other words, the British Government insisted on mentioning China in the agreement, without consulting her in its negotiation. As a result, an official memorandum was sent to the British Government, protesting in advance against reference to China in the alliance agreement without her actual participation in the conclusion of the treaty. The following is a translation of the *Aide-Memoire*, handed to the British Minister at Peking by the Chinese Foreign Office in May, 1920, relating to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance:

"We are repeatedly informed that reports have been in circulation regarding the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which will expire in July next year (1921). These reports aver that in view of a stipulation in the treaty, which obligates the Contracting Parties to confer together one year before its expiration, in case its renewal is desired, the British and Japanese Governments have already begun informally to exchange views on the subject, and that the alliance, if renewed, would have to be revised.

\* *Vide* Appendix H.



"The whole question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance affects the destiny of the Far East in general and of China in particular. The Chinese people view the proposed renewal of the alliance with deep concern and strong misgivings. Fortunately it has been an established international usage that when two friendly nations conclude a treaty, it can cover only those rights and interests which legitimately belong to the nations who are parties to the agreement.

"This usage has acquired fresh strength as a result of the European War, out of which has been developed the doctrine of equality of nations. The treaty of alliance in question contains reference to China and her integrity. Such reference, without China's actual participation in the conclusion of the treaty, will seriously impair the dignity and good name of her people as an independent nation. The Government and the people of China, therefore, cannot allow the matter to pass without expressing their emphatic protest.

"Your Excellency is therefore earnestly requested to convey the above statement confidentially to your Government for due consideration when the terms of the alliance are to be renewed."

To this protest, it is not known that the British Government has ever replied. China has had no assurance that her views will be heard and her wishes will be respected in the renewal of the alliance. She has, therefore, an unusually strong reason for opposing the continuation of the alliance. Any reference to her in the agreement, without her

knowledge or assent, or without her participation in the conclusion of the alliance, will, indeed, seriously impair "the dignity and good name of her people as an independent nation."

The case becomes all the more exasperating, when Japan and Great Britain, aside from mentioning China in the agreement without her assent, continue to undertake the maintenance of her independence and integrity. China does not and has never asked any Power to maintain her independence and integrity. For Japan and Great Britain to assume this rôle without reference to her wishes is a gratuitous insult, of which there should never be another repetition. Within the span of twenty years of the alliance's life, China's integrity has been violated, and her independence has been infringed upon, repeatedly. Japan has attempted a number of times to establish her police system in Manchuria, in Eastern Mongolia, and then in Fukien province; she has erected wireless stations at Hankow and Tsinan without the permission of the Chinese Government; she has extended her civil administration practically over the entire province of Shantung against the vigorous protest by the Chinese Government. Are these not sufficient evidence of infringements upon China's independence? On the other hand, Great Britain was, at least in one instance, guilty of violating China's territorial integrity. We refer to the secret agreement which she entered into with Japan, in Septem-

ber, 1917, whereby Shantung was handed over to her ally. With these instances in view, it would be nothing short of mockery to say that the alliance aims at insuring the independence and territorial integrity of China.

China's objection to this gratuitous undertaking by Japan and Great Britain is greatly strengthened by the fact that they are all members of the League of Nations. Article X of the Covenant of the League provides: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." This article, at the last meeting at Geneva of the Assembly of the League, has been recommended for retention by the Amendments Committee. It is plainly unnecessary, therefore, for Japan and Great Britain to renew their undertaking, which is meaningless as it is never meant to be carried out.

As a member of the League of Nations, China has another reason against the renewal of the alliance. Obviously, the League and the alliance are incompatible with each other—a fact which is admitted by Japan and Great Britain themselves in their promise to revise the treaty, so as to make it accord with the spirit and the letter of the Cove-

nant. Article XX of the Covenant says: "The members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof." Japan and Great Britain have officially admitted that the alliance is inconsistent with the League Covenant. Being such, it should be abrogated altogether. To retain it, even after due revision, would be not only contrary to the specific engagement provided for in Article XX, but also violating the very spirit of the League. "Since all members are on an equality and are allied for common purposes," observed the New York *Tribune*, "any special compact between two for mutual defence of their rights and interests against a third member is theoretically outlawed. Great Britain is bound to side against Japan, and Japan against Britain, in any case of disputes in which one or the other is found to be in the wrong by the League Council or Assembly. The dual community of interest is thus broken. There can be no *casus foederis* against another league member as to which either signator may exercise its independent judgment. Since, also, the Covenant provides for treating as a member any non-member involved in a dispute with a member, a pledge in advance by two Powers to assist each other is a violation of the whole spirit of the

peace enforcement sections of the League code." In other words, it ought to be plain to Japan and Great Britain that their obligations to each other as allies should be superseded by their obligations as members of the League.

A still more serious objection may be raised by China against the renewal of the alliance, and it is that the instrument has been an impediment to her economic development for the last twenty years. Instances are not lacking to show that Great Britain, being tied to her political partner in the Far East, has *nolens volens* sided with Japan on many occasions, in spite of the obvious fact that her own interests, her profession for the Open Door in China, and her undertakings in the alliance demanded that she should act against her ally.

One typical instance in which the Anglo-Japanese alliance actually obstructed China's economic development was furnished in the bickering between China and Japan in regard to the construction of a Manchurian railway in 1909. In November of the said year, the Viceroy of Manchuria entered into a contract with a British firm to build an extension of the North China Railway from Hsinmintun, about forty miles west of Mukden, to Fakumen. The Japanese Government objected to the construction of the line on the ground that it was in the neighbourhood of and parallel to the South Manchurian Railway which was transferred to the Japanese hands by the Portsmouth Treaty



of Peace between Japan and Russia. As a matter of fact, the nearest point on the proposed line is more than thirty-five miles distant from the South Manchurian Railway and separated from it by the Liao River. Furthermore, it is a very well-known fact that very little, if any, of the trade of this fertile and thickly populated district has found its way to the South Manchurian Railway; not even to-day. That the Japanese contention could not be supported was apparent; but the British Government supported the Japanese position, and the entire scheme fell through. Now, it may be said with truth that the failure to construct the line in question has been proved to be a very serious impediment to the economic development of Manchuria. At any rate, no one would believe that the position such as Japan had taken in this dispute was in the nature of preserving "the common interests of all nations in China" by insuring her independence and integrity and the principle of equal opportunities. It was a denial of "equal opportunity"; it was a direct attack upon China's independence and integrity by blocking her right of way. If the Contracting Parties of the alliance meant one thing and did another, they were not faithful to their own words. They were either deceiving themselves, which was improbable, or they were deceiving the world. If they did what they never meant to do, they had, at least, in that instance, violated the



principle of the Open Door and thus impeded the economic development for Manchuria.

But this was not all. As soon as the Hsinmintun-Fakumen scheme fell through, another line was proposed—one which we have already referred to in the previous chapter, the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. This line was to run from Chinchow, on the Gulf of Pechili, via Taonanfu, to Tsitsihar, on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and thence north to Aigun, on the Amur River, covering a distance of about 800 miles. It would run entirely through Mongolia, with the exception of a few miles at both ends. A glance at the geography of Manchuria and Mongolia would show that whole line would at no place come within a distance of less than fifty miles from the South Manchurian Railway, the traffic of which would not at all be affected. But Japan, not particularly anxious to see Manchuria and Mongolia developed as they should be, raised the same objection that the line under consideration would injuriously affect the traffic of the South Manchurian Railway, and therefore blocked the project altogether. This action, curiously enough, was again supported by the British Government. Unofficial explanations were offered that, being tied hard and fast by her alliance with Japan, Great Britain could have no other choice but to say ditto. If this were the real cause for the British support, as we have every reason to believe it was,

the alliance could not be anything else but a serious impediment to China's economic development, and ought to have been "denounced" and abrogated as soon as possible. The alliance of 1905, as that of 1911, had as its object the maintenance of the common interests of all nations. What the allies had done in this case was diametrically opposed to their professed object. The alliance undertook, as it was defined in the preamble, to maintain the principle of "equal opportunity." What they did was a denial of equal opportunity, not to the other Powers only, but to China as well. It was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that these two Powers had blocked the Manchurian Railway development; it was in violation of the Open Door principle to which they had been pledged; and it was a denial to China to exercise her sovereign rights in her own territory.

It is, of course, always difficult to say just exactly how much Great Britain was behind her ally in these two instances, or in other similar cases. It is easy to understand, however, that being in alliance with Japan, Great Britain did not enjoy freedom of action. She could ill afford to say "no" to her ally even in cases when she knew to be acting contrary to the avowed purposes of the alliance, or against her own interests. We can readily see that Great Britain did not need to endorse everything that Japan might do in China. Her complaisant attitude towards Japanese policy in China, however,

made it hard to say whether or not Great Britain was in complete accord with her ally.

This policy of complaisance, which the alliance has apparently induced Great Britain to adopt regarding Japanese activities in the Far East in general and in China in particular, is the ground for the belief, generally held among the Chinese, that the renewal of the alliance is tantamount to a public endorsement by Great Britain of Japanese policy in China and a "recognition of the *status quo*."

Since 1911 when the alliance was revised and extended, a good deal of water has flowed under the political bridge of the Far East. In those years immediately following the outbreak of the war in Europe and before the conclusion of peace, Japan has entrenched herself so firmly that her present position and influence in China is not only dominating, but domineering. She went into Manchuria in 1905 after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, and she has remained there ever since. Through her control over the means of communication, over the Manchurian currency (largely by the Bank of Chosen), and over the postal and telegraphic systems, Manchuria is to-day virtually a Japanese economic reserve. She went into Shantung in November, 1914, and in spite of her repeated promise to China and to the world at large to get out, she has remained there. By her systematic appropriation of the valuable properties in Kiaochow and Tsingtao left over by the Germans,

by her extensive investment in land, and by her control over the railways, Shantung is to-day another Manchuria to her. In 1915, she presented the "twenty-one demands" \* on China, and by threat of war, she forced the unwilling Government at Peking to accept. In a recent statement by a Japanese Government official, it is said that Japan would absolutely refuse "scrapping the twenty-one demands." In 1918, a clash occurred between Japanese soldiers and Chinese police at Cheng-chiatun, Manchuria. Under the pretext of maintaining peace in the district, Japan established her police system there, which has remained ever since. The same was attempted at Amoy but last year. And then it must not be forgotten that, during the last four or five years, Japan has loaned to Chinese officials in the North as well as in the South for the purpose of carrying on the civil war, to an amount approximating Yen 350,000,000. Because of this huge sum which Japan has loaned to China, she is now in a dominating position in regard to Chinese finance. In short, Japan's policy in China for the

\* The Twenty-one Demands were presented to China in five Groups. The first group consists of those which assure Japan of her succession to the German rights in Shantung; the second, of those which extend Japan's lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, the South Manchurian Railway and the Autung-Mukden Railway, and assure her economic (and political) rights in Eastern Mongolia; the third relating to the taking over of the Hanyehping Ironworks by a Chino-Japanese company; the fourth relating to the non-alienation of Chinese territory; and the fifth relating to the employment of Japanese advisers, Japanese "missionary" propaganda, control of China's munitions of war, etc., etc.

last ten years at least is one of economic penetration and political aggression. She has discarded every argument of prudence, and every consideration of restraint. She reckons on the continuous and almost unquestioned support from Great Britain, who, as we have said before, is, because of the existence of the alliance, deprived of her freedom of action, if not her independent judgment, and is consequently incapable of following any other course than of supporting or at least acquiescing in her ally's policy in China. When she was pressing the Twenty-one Demands on China, the United States filed a protest with both the Chinese and Japanese Governments. But Great Britain, her hands being tied by the alliance, had not a word to say. And what more convincing proof does the world need to show that Great Britain has always been on Japan's side than the secret agreement which she entered into in 1917, giving Shantung to her ally? Judged by her conduct in the Far East for the last few years, Japan cares little or nothing about the bitter resentments which she has provoked in China and the unfavourable public opinion which she has created in the Western world. So long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance remains, so long will Great Britain be on her side, in a diplomatic sense at least; and so long as Great Britain takes the side of her ally and acts as her second in all Far Eastern affairs, so long will Japan follow her policy of economic penetra-



tion and political aggression in China. There is, therefore, more than legitimate ground to suppose that the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, even in a modified form, will mean the continuance of Japan's domination in China.

A word may be said about the assertion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance seeks to maintain peace in the Far East—an assertion which has been repeated *ad nauseam*. Now, has the alliance really maintained peace in the Far East? The answer is not far to seek. It may be said that, while it is well borne out by the language of the alliance, the assertion is not substantiated by the fact. In concluding the agreement in 1902, the Governments of Japan and Great Britain were said to be “actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East.” When revised and renewed in 1905, the alliance had as one of its objects: “The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.” The same wish was expressed in the third agreement, in exactly the same language. These stipulations, however, are nothing more than the pious wishes of the Contracting Powers and are never meant to be realised. Or else, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the Anglo-Japanese joint attack upon the German leased territory in China in 1914 would not be very happy examples of the preservation of peace in the Far East. And unless one speaks with tongue in



the cheek, it is hardly accurate to say that the mobilisation by Japan of her military and naval forces to compel China to accept the "Twenty-one Demands," and the military expedition to Siberia which has resulted in the occupation by Japan of Vladivostock, of Niklolaievsk, of the northern half of Saghalien, and of Eastern Siberia, are exactly in the nature of preserving peace in Eastern Asia as provided for in the terms of the alliance.

On the contrary, the alliance, instead of being an instrument of peace, has proved to be an instrument of war. At least for two armed conflicts in the Far East, the alliance can be said to be directly responsible. If one thing is more certain than another, it is that the Russo-Japanese War was the direct and almost immediate outcome of the alliance.\* In the first place, the agreement was

\* Speaking in the House of Commons, February 13, 1902, defending the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour said that the alliance would make "strongly for peace." "In these days," he continued, "while a war between two Powers is sufficiently formidable, a war in which a large number of Powers is involved is practically so great an undertaking that even the most adventurous statesmanship would shrink from it. If it were possible for two first-class Powers to coalesce to fight against Japan, the result would be either that Japan would be crushed, would suffer very serious losses, and be practically crippled, or that before that event took place she would modify her policy to suit the demands of her two antagonists (the two antagonists Mr. Balfour had then in mind were Russia and France). It is neither good for us that Japan should be crushed, nor that through a coalition of two Powers she should be obliged to mould her policy in a direction antagonistic to our interests. Now that this Treaty has been carried out, it is quite evident that that contingency can not take place. There never can be two Powers ranged against Japan alone, any more than there can

entered into in anticipation of an armed struggle between Japan and Russia. And secondly, the undertaking by Great Britain to remain neutral when Japan was involved in war with one Power only, and to come to Japan's assistance when she was attacked by more than one Power, had the effect of not only keeping the field clear for Japanese action, when actual hostilities were commenced, but also encouraging Japan to go on the war-path, when she could yet be dissuaded from resorting to force. In 1914, upon the outbreak of the war in Europe, Sir Conyngham Greene, then British Ambassador at Tokio, made a formal request on behalf of his Government for Japanese assistance under the terms of the alliance. On August 4, Baron Kato, then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that Japan would be ready to meet the responsibilities which she had assumed according to the terms of the alliance. Thus, on August 14, Japan sent an ultimatum to the German Government, demanding Germany to withdraw from the Far East entirely. Upon Germany's fail-

be two Powers ranged against us alone in the Far East. That fact clearly and evidently makes for what is the greatest interest of the civilised world—the interest of peace." Apparently, Mr. Balfour did not think that a war between Japan and Russia alone would disturb the peace of the world. Lord Lansdowne, who concluded the alliance, was more practical. Speaking in the House of Lords on the same day, he said: "It is an agreement which will make for the maintenance of the peace of the world, and should that peace unfortunately be broken, its effect will be to restrict the area within which hostilities are likely to take place."

ure to accept, Japan issued, on August 23, the declaration of war, in which she referred to the obligation she incurred under the alliance as the ground for her action.

In view of these facts, it will be presuming too much upon the intelligence of the world to say that the alliance has succeeded in preserving the peace in the Far East. China has very strong reasons for complaining against the failure of the Contracting Powers to carry out the fundamental object, as it has been so called, of the alliance. Of course, whether the alliance has or has not succeeded in maintaining peace in the Far East is a question that does not directly concern China. But the fact that, because of its failure to maintain peace, wars were fought right on the Chinese territory, is a serious question which China cannot overlook. The Russo-Japanese War was fought in Manchuria, and the Anglo-Japanese attack upon the German fortress at Tsingtao was carried on in the Province of Shantung. China's neutrality was violated; her sovereignty was infringed upon; and her territorial rights were totally disregarded. And what is worse is that, after each conflict, the victorious party remains on the Chinese territory! Japan would not have closed the Open Door in Manchuria had she not secured for herself as a result of the Russo-Japanese War such a stronghold therein as to enable her to do whatever she might please; and she would not have been in Shantung to-day if she

had not been requested under the terms of the alliance to dispossess the Germans from their leased territory in China, so as to maintain peace in the Far East. These violations of China's neutrality, encroachments upon her sovereign rights, and attacks upon her territorial integrity—are they not, one and all, the direct blessings of the Anglo-Japanese alliance? For these blessings, China should be thankful to none but Japan and Great Britain, who contracted the alliance to maintain peace only to have war.

## VII

### CONCLUSION

**W**HAT action is to be taken on the Anglo-Japanese alliance? Will the Washington conference permit it to be renewed, revised, and extended? Or, can a general understanding be reached at the conference to take the place of the alliance?

Strictly speaking, the alliance is an affair exclusively between Japan and Great Britain. These two Powers are, therefore, disposed, at least technically, to take the view that the question of the renewal or non-renewal of the alliance is separate from the discussions of the armament conference. On the other hand, the fact is well recognised that these two questions are interdependent, and that neither Japan, nor Great Britain, nor the United States can proceed far with either question without the other. It is not at all unlikely, particularly in view of the fact that the armament conference is also to discuss the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, that some general understanding on broad principles will be reached among the Powers interested in the Pacific and the Far East so as to make the renewal of the alliance entirely unnecessary.

There is a general belief that the Washington

conference on limitation of armaments furnishes the opportunity of developing the Anglo-Japanese alliance into an agreement among all the Powers interested in the Eastern hemisphere. The New York *Evening Post* points out that, "if we only will, we can seize upon this question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and expand it into a grand assize of the Pacific." Viscount Kato of Japan said that the prime motive of the Washington conference lay in the common desire of Great Britain and the United States to seek some agreement between themselves, and between them and Japan, in the hope of replacing the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The hope that a Pacific understanding of some kind would result from the Washington conference so as to take the place of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is shared by many responsible statesmen of British Dominions and frankly avowed by the British Prime Minister. In his speech to the House of Commons on August 18, 1921, while saying ditto to the American Secretary of State in regard to the programme of the Washington conference and praising the loyalty of the Japanese to the treaty of alliance, the British Prime Minister made it quite plain that England would be at once pleased and relieved if the outcome of the deliberations at Washington could put aside the Anglo-Japanese alliance and substitute for it a Pacific Ocean understanding in which all the Powers, including China, especially interested in the great problems of the



Pacific and of the Far East are ready to join. In other words, the British Premier, like many of his fellow countrymen, has seen in the Washington conference an opportunity of evolving some diplomatic formula which can take the place of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. "In the part of his speech in the Commons which dealt with the Japanese alliance," the *New York Times* remarked, "Mr. Lloyd George had the air of a man rubbing his hands over happily getting rid of a troublesome question." But the "troublesome question" has not yet been gotten rid of. The question is one yet to be solved. There had been some doubt at first whether the joint communication to the League of Nations about the treaty of the alliance had not had the legal effect of "denouncing" it. But the Lord High Chancellor has since definitely decided that it had not—a view shared by the Japanese Government itself. The treaty of alliance is, therefore, by its own terms, in force for one more year, and will continue to be in force indefinitely until one year after its denunciation. And in the second place, there is no assurance that any hard and fast understanding such as the British or the Japanese diplomats might expect will emerge from the Washington conference with the United States and China as its contracting parties. China has learned to cherish great suspicions against the Anglo-Japanese alliance or any similar international agreement. As the Chinese Minister at Washington has pointed

out, the Anglo-Japanese alliance "is a warlike measure designed by England and Japan to protect their interests in the Far East." It can be taken for granted that China will not bind herself to any "warlike measure" which seeks to further Anglo-Japanese interests in the Far East. In the past, the alliance has been nothing but a diplomatic instrument which safeguards and improves the interests of Japan and Great Britain in the Far East largely at the expense of China. Is it likely, or is it thinkable, that China will lend her hand in the making of the rope which is designed for her own strangulation?

On the other hand, the attitude of the United States towards entangling alliances is too well-known to be pointed out here. The United States will not enter into any agreement partaking the nature of an alliance, nor will she become a party to any understanding which binds her to a certain course of action in the Pacific and in the Far East other than that of maintaining peace on the basis of the Open Door and equality of opportunity. This is not in the nature of a political prediction. The policy of the United States towards entangling engagements is well known, and no one need be a political prophet in order to be able to foretell what she might or might not do in regard to proposals of an Anglo-American-Chinese-Japanese alliance. Thus, when Premier Lloyd George expressed the hope in the House of Commons that Great Britain's

alliance with Japan may yet emerge into a greater understanding between Great Britain, Japan, the United States and China on all problems of the Pacific to serve as a guarantee of peace in that region, the administration at Washington was ominously silent, and no indication has been forthcoming that the hope so generally cherished by the statesmen of Great Britain will be realised as a result of the Washington conference. "But a common understanding between the Powers interested in the Far East, with a view to maintaining peace on the basis of the Open Door and equality of opportunity, would be welcome to the Administration," said the Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* in a special despatch to that paper, August 19, 1921. "Officials are inclined to make sharp distinctions between the kind of agreements that might be entered into," he continued. "In the usually accepted sense, an alliance is an agreement entered into by two or more Powers to protect particular interests. In the modern acceptance of an agreement, the Contracting Parties reach an accord upon common principles which are to actuate them in their dealings with the other parties. It is this kind of understanding that the Harding Administration would be likely to take an interest in. Whether the United States would be willing to enter a tripartite understanding to the extent of agreeing to a certain course of action is doubtful." In other words, what the United States would like to arrange is an

agreement among all the Powers interested in the Pacific upon the principles that shall govern them in dealing with the questions that may arise in the Eastern Hemisphere. It will be an agreement to which China can become a willing and consenting party. The British statesmen and diplomatists may send out all their trial balloons to test the public sentiment in the United States. They are, one and all, destined to collapse, if their goal is a hard and fast agreement to take the place of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the renewal of which Japanese statesmen have endeavoured to bring about, but British statesmen have apparently decided to avoid. The United States cannot be expected to allow herself to be tied to the wheels of the chariot of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy, and it would be foolish to suppose that the nation which has declined even to become a member of the League of Nations could ever be persuaded to form a hide-bound partnership with Japan and Great Britain. While it is not impossible, in fact, it is to be hoped for, that as a result of the Washington conference a general understanding will be reached in regard to the problems in the Pacific and the Far East, it is entirely out of question that either China or the United States will enter into any agreement that has as its object the protection of special interests of particular Powers in the Far East, as it is the case with the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The question will naturally arise: To what kind

of agreement will China become a consenting and willing party? Of course, China's position *vis-à-vis* the Anglo-Japanese alliance is well known and requires no further elucidation. It is to be expected that she will vigorously oppose any attempt to bring about an international agreement that is similar to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in object and in practice. She will perhaps be ready to consent to an agreement in which the Powers, instead of undertaking, as it has been their favourite pastime in the past, to guarantee her independence and integrity, pledge themselves not to encroach upon China and to redeem their existing relations which seriously affect her independence and integrity. In other words, China will welcome a negative undertaking, instead of a positive guarantee. At present, there are in existence more than ten treaties and agreements in which China's integrity and independence are guaranteed, but none of which have been of any effect. China has never asked any Power to guarantee her independence and integrity; what she wants is that the Powers do not violate them. To assume the rôle of a guarantor without reference to her wishes is a humiliating insult, which can be easily appreciated by the Powers themselves. And then China will perhaps also be ready to consent to an agreement in which the Powers, instead of proclaiming once again the Open Door policy and the principle of equal opportunities for all nations, merely undertake not to do anything to



obstruct China's economic development. In other words, China welcomes an engagement by the Powers not to obstruct her economic freedom, instead of an undertaking by them for the maintenance of the Open Door policy. Of course, it is needless to add that any agreement that tends to preserve peace in the Far East and in the world is welcome to China.

But the last Power to be heard from is Japan, who can really help make the Washington conference a success or a failure. It is a well-known fact that Japan is very anxious to continue the alliance, and through her opposition or approval, an international agreement along the lines such as suggested above may become a possibility or merely a day dream.

It is interesting to examine the reasons given for the renewal of the alliance. From the Japanese point of view, it is urged that the friendly relations between Japan and Great Britain require the continuance of the alliance; that unless it is renewed, Japan will be diplomatically isolated; and that it is still needed in view of the Bolshevik menace from Russia. On the other hand, Great Britain is lukewarm in her interest in the continuance of the alliance, as can be seen from the public utterances of her leading statesmen. Whatever arguments there are in favour of the alliance, they are offered by Premier Hughes of Australia, who, nevertheless, like all his colleagues, thinks of the al-



liance predominantly in terms of the United States. He favours the renewal of the alliance on the ground that it affords the cheapest means of protection for Australia,\* that Great Britain would be in a better position to exercise her influence upon Japan's policy as an ally rather than as a potential enemy. Besides these two reasons, there seems to be in England a general feeling that, for a country

\* In this connection, it is highly interesting to remember the argument which Premier Hughes of Australia has advanced in urging the renewal of the alliance, and to compare it with the statement which he had made in 1911, when the alliance was under revision. In 1911, Premier Hughes, among the supporters of the alliance, said that he welcomed it as giving Australia ten more years to strengthen her defence. His present argument is that the safety of Australia demands the continuance of the alliance which is regarded as the cheapest means of protection. This amounts to saying: "Australia is afraid of Japan, and it is therefore necessary to bind her in an alliance to diminish her danger and to save the cost of a huge navy." This point of view is very easy for the Japanese to understand. Under the caption "Alliance and Navy," the *Jiji*, a well-known Japanese daily, remarks sarcastically: "Mr. Hughes's attitude toward the alliance was cool in the spring of last year (1920) when Australia was determined to build a 'self-guaranteeing navy,' with Japan for their hypothetical enemy. But now (June, 1921) both the Premier (Mr. Hughes) and the Secretary of Finance (Sir Joseph Cook), who was formerly Secretary of Navy, extol the service of the Japanese Navy in the past and express themselves desirous of the maintenance of the same relations in future. Seeing that a battleship will cost Yen 80,000,000 in the near future, and that it is no easy matter to build a really strategically efficient navy, it is quite reasonable for the Australian Government to try and economise naval expenditure by means of every diplomatic means. As it is almost unimaginable that so long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance remains in force Australia should be attacked by a third Power, why should they not ensure their national defence economically by making use of the alliance?" It is open to question, however, whether Premier Hughes's attitude represents the real sentiment of the Australian people.

which has been in continuous alliance with Portugal since the twelfth century, it does not look well to throw Japan over "after nearly twenty years of amicable intimacy."

We need not go into the merits of the arguments. Whether or not they can be considered as valid reasons for urging the renewal of the alliance ought to be very clear to those who have watched the international situation of to-day. There can be no denying that Japan, for reasons apparently other than those given above, is very anxious to have the alliance renewed and extended, and she will leave no stone unturned to achieve her ambition. Great Britain is, however, lukewarm in her interest in the alliance, and owing to the objections from the Dominions and China and America, she is more than ready to drop it altogether. If the alliance is to be dropped, she is, of course desirous of avoiding "humiliating Japan and perhaps arousing within her a spirit which might react unfortunately upon the situation in the Pacific." So, in the last analysis, Japan is the one and only one Power who can help or kill the chance of successful arrival at a general understanding in place of the alliance. There can be no hope for such a general understanding, if Japan has in view something quite apart from the avowed objects of the alliance.

## APPENDIX A

AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN,  
RELATIVE TO CHINA AND COREA (ALLIANCE, ETC.).—  
SIGNED AT LONDON, JANUARY 30, 1902

THE Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:—

### ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action

of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

#### ARTICLE II

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

#### ARTICLE III

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

#### ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

#### ARTICLE V

Whenever, in opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

## ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance, shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE, *His Britannic Majesty's  
Principal Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs.*

(L.S.) HAYASHI, *Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary of His  
Majesty the Emperor of Japan at  
the Court of St. James.*

## APPENDIX B

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald*

*Foreign Office, Jánuary 30, 1902.*

SIR:

I have signed to-day, with the Japanese Minister, an Agreement between Great Britain and Japan, of which a copy is enclosed in this despatch.

This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome of the events which have taken place during the last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.

Throughout the troubles and complications which arose in China consequent upon the Boxer outbreak and the attack upon the Peking Legations, the two Powers have been in close and uninterrupted communication, and have been actuated by similar views.

We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the territorial *status quo* either in China or in the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained.

From the frequent exchanges of views which have taken place between the two Governments, and from



the discovery that their Far Eastern policy was identical, it has resulted that each side has expressed the desire that their common policy should find expression in an international contract of binding validity.

We have thought it desirable to record it in the Preamble of that instrument the main objects of our common policy in the Far East to which I have already referred, and in the first Article we join in entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or Corea. We have, however, thought it necessary also to place on record the view entertained by both the High Contracting Parties, that, should their interests as above described be endangered, it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests; and words have been added which will render it clear that such precautionary measures might become necessary and might be legitimately taken, not only in the case of aggressive action or of an actual attack by some other Power, but in the event of disturbances arising of a character to necessitate the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

The principal obligations undertaken mutually by the High Contracting Parties are those of maintaining a strict neutrality in the event of either of them becoming involved in war, and of coming to one another's assistance in the event of either of them being confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile Power. Under the remaining provisions of the Agreement, the High Contracting Parties undertake that

neither of them will, without consultation with the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests described in the Agreement, and that whenever those interests are in jeopardy they will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

The concluding Article has reference to the duration of the Agreement which, after five years, is terminable by either of the High Contracting Parties at one year's notice.

His Majesty's Government have been largely influenced in their decision to enter into this important contract by the conviction that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence of important British interests. It in no way threatens the present position or the legitimate interests of other Powers. On the contrary, that part of it which renders either of the High Contracting Parties liable to be called upon by the other for assistance can operate only when one of the allies has found himself obliged to go to war in defence of interests which are common to both, when the circumstances in which he has taken this step are such as to establish that the quarrel has not been of his own seeking, and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds himself threatened, not by a single Power, but by a hostile coalition.

His Majesty's Government trust that the Agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the two

countries, that it will make for the preservation of peace, and that, should peace unfortunately be broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities.

I am, etc.,

LANSDOWNE.

## APPENDIX C

### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, 12TH AUGUST, 1905

#### PREAMBLE

THE Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

#### ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will con-

sider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

## ARTICLE II

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

## ARTICLE III

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

## ARTICLE IV

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

## ARTICLE V

The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into

separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE VI

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

#### ARTICLE VII

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by naval and military authorities of the contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

#### ARTICLE VIII

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, shall remain binding until the expiration of one



year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

LANSDOWNE, *His Britannic Majesty's  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs.*

TADASU HAYASHI, *Envoy Extraordinary  
and Minister Plenipotentiary of His  
Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the  
Court of St. James.*

## APPENDIX D

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge*

*Foreign Office, September 6, 1905.*

SIR:

I enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a new Agreement concluded between His Majesty's Government and that of Japan in substitution for that of the 30th of January, 1902. You will take an early opportunity of communicating the new Agreement to the Russian Government.

It was signed on the 12th of August, and you will explain that it would have been immediately made public but for the fact that negotiations had at that time already commenced between Russia and Japan, and that the publication of such a document whilst those negotiations were still in progress would obviously have been improper and inopportune.

The Russian Government will, I trust, recognise that the new Agreement is an international instrument, to which no exception can be taken by any of the Powers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You should call special attention to the objects mentioned in the preamble as those by which the policy of the contracting parties is inspired. His Majesty's Government believes that they may count upon the goodwill and support of all the Powers in endeavouring to maintain peace in Eastern Asia, and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence of the Chinese

Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country.

On the other hand, the special interests of the contracting parties are of a kind upon which they are full entitled to insist, and the announcement that those interests must be safeguarded is one which can create no surprise, and need give rise to no misgivings.

I call your special attention to the wording of Article II, which lays down distinctly that it is only in the case of an unprovoked attack made on one of the contracting parties by another Power or Powers, and when that party is defending its territorial rights and special interests from aggressive action, that the other party is bound to come to its assistance.

Article III, dealing with the question of Korea, is deserving of special attention. It recognises in the clearest terms the paramount position which Japan at this moment occupies, and must henceforth occupy in Korea, and her right to take any measures which she may find necessary for the protection of her political, military, and economic interests in that country. It is, however, expressly provided that such measures must not be contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of other nations. The new Treaty no doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity of the Japanese Empire, and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.

His Majesty's Government observe with satisfac-

tion that this point was readily conceded by Russia in the Treaty of Peace recently concluded with Japan, and they have every reason to believe that similar views are held by other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and Korea.

His Majesty's Government venture to anticipate that the alliance thus concluded, designed as it is with objects which are purely peaceful, and for the protection of rights and interests, the validity of which cannot be contested, will be regarded with approval by the Government to which you are accredited. They are justified in believing that its conclusion may not have been without effect in facilitating the settlement by which the war has been so happily brought to an end, and they earnestly trust that it may, for many years to come, be instrumental in securing the peace of the world in those regions which come within its scope.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## APPENDIX E

### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911

#### PREAMBLE

THE Government of Japan and the Government of Great Britain having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August 12, 1905, and believing that the revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:

A.—The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

B.—The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

C.—The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in those regions:—

#### ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests

referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

#### ARTICLE II

If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either of the High Contracting Parties should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

#### ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE IV

Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force.



## ARTICLE V

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in circumstances entered into the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and frankly upon all questions of mutual interests.

## ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the Alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed their seals thereto. Done at London July 13, 1911.

T. KATO, *the Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.*

EDWARD GREY, *H.B.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

## APPENDIX F

THE views and opinions of the Chinese people on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and its renewal are well known. They are, however, best embodied in the memorandum which ten important Chinese organisations in Shanghai had presented to Sir Beilby Alston, British Minister to Peking, who was on his way to London on furlough, July, 1920. The document, setting forth the reasons for which the Chinese people have objected to the continuance of the alliance, was signed by The Educational Association of Kiangsu Province; The Shanghai City Chamber of Commerce; The Chinese Bankers' Association; The Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association; The Shanghai Educational Association; The Western Returned Students' Union; The World's Chinese Students' Federation; The Overseas Federation; The Chinese Christian Union; and The National Association of Vocational Education of China. It reads:

"This memorandum is drawn up in order to call the attention of the British Government to the rapidly growing public sentiment in China against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, at least in its present form.

"It is to be conceded at the outset that it is not an appropriate act for a third party to interfere when two governments desire to enter into an alliance or to renew an existing one; but it will be the duty of the third party to register its objection if the alliance

so contracted directly concerns the welfare of the third party.

"The Anglo-Japanese alliance does concern the welfare of China; for, in section B of the preamble of the alliance, in the text of both the 1905 and 1911 agreements, matters affecting China's international standing and relations were specially treated.

"The Chinese people will look to their Government to take diplomatic steps to register China's objections to its renewal without consulting China.

"The present memorandum merely sets forth the views of the Chinese people, as reflected through the various organisations in whose name this statement is made.

"The question is dealt with here only in these aspects which touch upon the interests of China.

"In forming an alliance, there are, at least, two motives to be accounted for:

"First, what are the objects to be attained?

"And, secondly, what are the antagonisms to be offset?

"The objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, presumably, were to protect the interests of Great Britain and Japan in the Far East, and the antagonisms were at first the power and policy of Russia and later those of Germany.

"The two motives are, in the last analysis, really only one—to combine the strength and resources of Great Britain and of Japan in order to protect their interests in the Far East, which were considered to be identical, from a common enemy, at first Russia and later Germany.

"These motives do not exist now. Russia fought on the side of the Allies for over three years and, in spite of the Revolution, which crippled her as a fighting unit for the Allies, its menace to East Asia as an aggressive power no longer exists. She is in no position to endanger the interests of Great Britain or Japan.

"The power of Germany before the Great War was indeed most threatening. Her navy was rapidly developed, so as to challenge the British supremacy. Realising her growing strength she did not even take the trouble to conceal her policy of the conquest of the world.

"What the Great War has done to Germany needs no comment. It may be said without any fear of contradiction that Germany is no more a menace to the interests of Great Britain and Japan in East Asia.

"With the elimination of these Powers antagonistic to the contracting parties, the motives calling forth the alliance are also removed.

"We therefore maintain that there is no necessity to renew the alliance unless there should arise a new enemy. So far as we are aware, no such enemy exists.

"The United States of America is the only Power that has the strength to be a menace to the Anglo-Japanese interests in the East; but history has demonstrated America's disinterestedness in China.

"She is not likely to change overnight her traditional policy of friendship for China, her Hay doctrine of the 'open door' and equal opportunities, to an aggressive attitude.

"The objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as

far as China is concerned, are specific and unequivocal.

"Section B of the preamble says: 'The preservation of the common interests of the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.'

"Japan's actions, however, are at variance with her professions. When Europe was desperately engaged in a life-and-death struggle for liberty, Japan presented to China, January 18, 1915, the well-known 'Twenty-one Demands.'

"These demands could only be matched in spirit and purpose with the demands Austria made upon Serbia which led to the World War.

"The dark designs of the demands were greatly heightened by Japan's unusual actions. Instead of presenting these demands through the regular diplomatic channel of the Chinese Government, its Foreign Office, the Japanese Minister handed the same to President Yuan Shih-k'ai directly, who was required to maintain utter secrecy and to take speedy action.

"When secrecy could no longer be maintained, Japan at first made official denial of the existence of any of the demands, then the existence of some of them, and finally had to confess to the existence of all of them.

"The demands cannot stand any scrutiny without arousing indignation, even among impartial observers of Far Eastern affairs.

"We will quote the words of a well-known British publicist whose analysis of the demands will go to show such indignation.

"In the first group of these articles China concedes in advance any arrangements that Japan might in the future make with Germany regarding the possession of Kiao-chow and other rights in the province of Shantung. The way was thus paved for Japan's later victory at the Peace Conference.

"In the second group of articles Japan demands that China recognise Japan's special privileges in Manchuria, privileges accorded to no other nation. For example, Article 3 reads:

" 'Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

" 'Article 4—The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.

" 'Article 6—If the Chinese Government employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted.'

"That is how Japan kept her promise to maintain the 'open door' and the independence of China in Manchuria. In Group IV, furthermore:

" 'The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to any third power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.'

"Even this group, however, did not offer the worst instance of special privilege or infringement of China's sovereignty. The articles of Group V go further:

" 'The Chinese Government shall employ influential



Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

“The police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

“China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say fifty per cent. or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

“If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour work (including dock-yards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.’

“In making these demands Japan broke at least six solemn public promises. That she had forgotten neither the spirit nor the letter of these promises, and that she was ready to break one more, is a fact confirmed by a statement issued on May 6, 1915, by Bryan:

“At the beginning of negotiations the Japanese Government confidentially informed this Government (the United States) of the matters which were under discussion, and accompanied the information with the assurance that Japan had no intention of interfering with either the political independence or territorial integrity of China and that nothing she proposed would discriminate against other Powers having treaties with China, or interfere with the ‘open door’

policy to which all the leading nations are committed.'

"What are we to think of the pledged word of a nation which could vouch for such assurances at a time when its Government was attempting to wrench from China the control of her own armament and her own territory?

"Through just such stages did Korea slowly succumb, that same Korea whose 'independence' was once as firmly guaranteed by Japan.

"This fact was clear to China and to all the world, and an indignant public opinion in China, England and America prevented China's signing the articles under Groups IV and V.

"The position of Great Britain was made quite embarrassing by Japan's actions, both during the war and at the Peace Conference, when dealing with the Shantung question.

"Great Britain declared war against Germany on account of the latter's attack on France and violation of the neutrality of Belgium; yet she had to give tacit consent to Japan's violation of the neutrality of China when Japan declared war on Germany and undertook to reduce the German hold at Kiao-chow.

"Instead of landing her forces within the leased territory of Kiaochow, as the British did, she took them to Lungkow, a point two hundred miles to the northwest of Tsingtao; and again, instead of marching her soldiers southeastward towards the point of attack, namely, Tsingtao, they pushed southwestward towards Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, which was then neutral territory.

"Great Britain was further embarrassed by the secret agreement entered into between herself and Japan on February 16, 1917, wherein she promised to support Japan on the Shantung question at the Peace Conference.

"This promise was the price Great Britain had to pay in order to retain Japan's support in the prosecution of the war; yet it was made at the time when China was being induced to join in the war on the side of the Allies, which she afterwards actually did.

"The Chinese people learned with great pain of the existence of this secret agreement, when it was made known at the Peace Conference, knowing fully well its effect upon the Shantung question as Great Britain would feel in honour bound to maintain the agreement.

"During the last two decades there has developed the practice among the Powers of treating China as a semi-dependent country. Instead of treating directly with China concerning her affairs and welfare, they treated among themselves as if China were a mere diplomatic appendage. The Chinese people cannot but regard such practice with apprehension and resentment, especially in the case where a certain Power assumes a paternal diplomatic relationship to China and pretends to exercise a right to intervene in the diplomatic intercourse between China and any other country.

"Even the United States Government made the same mistake in the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes without consulting China. The Chinese Government had to file a protest against it. The United States of

America has always maintained the most friendly attitude towards China, but we refuse to be treated except as an independent nation exercising full sovereign rights.

“With the formal ratification by China of the Austrian Treaty (of Peace), which she signed with the Allied Powers on the one hand and Austria on the other, we became a full member of the League of Nations.

“A renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance under the existing or similar terms, taken with the previous interpretation of the alliance in practice, will cause the Chinese strongly to suspect that, when China takes an appeal to the League of Nations for redress of her grievances, Great Britain and Japan will be found to have made a private agreement prejudicial to China’s case, and which may adversely affect China’s hope of obtaining justice from the League.

“This has been amply borne out by the secret agreement made between Great Britain and Japan on February 16, 1917, which was one of the chief factors, if not the chief factor, in deciding the Shantung question in favour of Japan. China was obliged to refrain from signing the German Treaty as a protest against the injustice of the settlement.

“We would wish to see that Great Britain will make no further entangling alliances which might tie her hands again on questions brought by China before the League of Nations.

In presenting this memorandum to the British Government we merely voice the sentiment of the people. In our humble opinion the changed conditions

of the world to-day do not call for any further renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

"The motives of the alliance, so far as they concern China, do not exist to-day. The aggressive and imperialistic policy of Russia and Germany has passed away and there is no further menace from any other Power.

"The violation of the objects of the alliance by Japan has seriously embarrassed Great Britain. The renewal of the alliance, at least under the existing or similar terms, tends only to irritate China on the one hand and to cause Great Britain to share the distrust of the Chinese people so widely and deeply entertained towards Japan.

"Besides, a renewal of the alliance will only cause the Chinese people strongly to suspect Great Britain's having some other motives, as the Covenant of the League of Nations covers the ground of the alliance, and China is an original member of the League."

## APPENDIX G

### LONDON CHINA ASSOCIATION'S LETTER TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE

CHINA ASSOCIATION,  
99, CANNON STREET, E. C.,  
LONDON, June 21st, 1921.

SIR:

My Committee have the honour to lay before His Majesty's Government certain points likely to affect British interests in China, which they respectfully hope will be taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government when dealing with the question of the renewal or modification of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan.

The advantages of the alliance to both countries were clearly demonstrated in 1904 and 1914, and in view of the unsettled state of affairs still prevailing in so large a portion of Asia, we would lay great stress upon the importance of maintaining the cordial relations between this country and Japan which have existed for so many years.

According to the representations made to us from China, there can be little doubt that a strong feeling has arisen in that country that one at least of the stipulations of the Treaty has not been carried out in practice—the clause referred to is that for the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of



the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all Nations in China. A concrete case in supporting this contention is the Japanese action in Shantung to which my Committee called attention in detail on the 8th February, 1920. We are informed that the situation there is still unsatisfactory. The Chinese view is that the terms of the Treaty have not been conscientiously carried out, and that a renewal of the Treaty upon the same terms, after this non-fulfilment, would be tantamount to recognition of the status quo, and could not therefore be looked upon as a friendly act on the part of Great Britain. It is reported that an important section of public opinion in Japan is inclined to regard the action of their Government in Shantung as ill-advised, and from an economic point of view, a failure. If therefore, His Majesty's Government could take any steps to bring about a friendly settlement of this question in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty, we believe their efforts would be appreciated by China and would be welcomed by many in Japan.

In any case my Committee hope that His Majesty's Government will give consideration to the feeling in China to which we have drawn attention.

Another point about which the Chinese people are somewhat sensitive is that any Agreement affecting their country or their sovereign rights should be concluded by foreign Powers, otherwise than in consultation with them.

As regards the situation generally my Committee is of opinion that Great Britain has no interest in China

which is not shared by the Dominions, by America, by France, and by Japan as laid down by her leading statesmen in public utterances.

It would be idle to deny that there is a powerful party in Japan in favour of a policy in China which is entirely at variance with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but we assume that the settled policy of the Japanese Government will conform to the terms of any Treaty to which it attaches its signature.

If then the interests of the four great Powers in China are identical, if these interests consist as we believe they do, in promoting a reconstructive policy in China, in uniting to carry out in practice the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, in ensuring the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations, and further in assisting China to establish a stable Government capable of maintaining peace and order within her borders, we are of opinion that a development of the Japanese alliance into an agreement between the four great Powers would do much to consolidate and maintain the General peace of the Far East for many years to come.

In the Consortium financial groups representing the four Powers have already come to an Agreement regarding some forms of industrial development in China. My Committee respectfully suggest that it is worthy of consideration whether the four Governments could not conclude an Agreement constituting a national Consortium, in which China might be invited to join. We believe an Agreement of this kind would enlist the active sympathy and co-operation of a large

and influential portion of the people of China, who would welcome an opportunity of re-establishing the stability of the country and promoting its prosperity and welfare.

The course indicated would at the same time add to the prosperity of all other nations' interests in the Far East, perhaps most of all to the prosperity of our Ally, Japan.

My Committee recognise that there are other and wider interests involved in the question of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but they refrain from discussing these aspects of the question, being outside the scope of the activities of their Association.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) F. ANDERSON, *Chairman.*

*H. M. Under Secretary of State  
for Foreign Affairs,  
Downing Street,  
S. W. I.*

## APPENDIX H

CHINESE OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO THE PRESS,  
JUNE 6, 1920

"THREE months ago the attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to statements appearing in the world's press regarding the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Inasmuch as an important element in the text of both of the 1905 and 1911 agreements was section B of the preamble, which treated of matters affecting China's international standing and international relations without the prior consent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch as public opinion throughout the Republic had long shown deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the Chinese Government decided that the time has arrived to address representations to the British Government.

"Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese Minister in London to make formal enquiries regarding the reports appearing in the press and to point out that while obviously the international arrangements of other Powers did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than the High Contracting Parties, the treatment of China merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such agreements would no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of the country and would indeed be viewed by all as an unfriendly act.

"To these first enquiries China received the following verbal reply: first, that the question of the renewal or the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not yet come up for consideration; secondly, that inasmuch as the successive agreements had been couched in the same language, it would naturally follow that if the alliance were renewed it must follow the same lines.

"In consequence of this reply a Memorandum was prepared analysing the three successive Alliance instruments and establishing clearly (A) that the original instrument of 1902 was radically different from the 1905 agreement in that the independence of Korea was specifically guaranteed in the first; (B) that the agreement of 1905 so far from being identical included India for the first time within its scope, whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position and clearly earmarked for annexation; and (C) that the agreement of 1911 introduced into the Preamble the definite statement 'having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation, etc.,' and then definitely dropped all reference to the numbered articles regarding either Korea or India, because understandings entered into with Russia had made mutual pledges regarding them superfluous.


"In view, then, of the fact that beneath the framework of what is on the surface a self-denying ordinance, vital and far-reaching changes have acquired the sanction of the High Contracting Parties, it is natural that Chinese public opinion becomes distrustful of any renewal of this agreement, from the opera-


tion of which China had suffered enough during the World War, especially in the matter of Shantung.

"Furthermore, as the ratification of the Austrian Treaty has made China a member of the League of Nations which she assumes was created in good faith, she is advised that a contract regarding her affairs between other members of the League cannot be entered into without her prior consent. Article X is a sufficient guarantee that her territorial integrity will be respected.

"So far China has not received from Great Britain a reply to her memorandum. She is anxious, however, to hear from Britain so that she may address an identical note to Japan and establish definitely the national attitude on a question vital to the peace and prosperity of her people."







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